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1 
Introduction 
 
 
While American-Iranian relations today are rocky at best, in the first half of 
the twentieth century, those relations were cordial – even friendly.  It was not until 
the 1950s, when the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency supported the coup d'état that 
toppled Iranian politician Mohammed Mosaddeq from power, that American-
Iranian relations truly turned sour.  In order to understand the origins of American-
Iranian relations, we must look back to World War II – a period of time when the 
United States was just beginning to form a serious, forward-looking, long-term 
policy towards Iran.  Prior to the war, the United States maintained a minor 
diplomatic presence in Iran in order to support Americans traveling there, but it did 
not otherwise have a particularly strong interest in the region.  This changed, 
however, at the outbreak of the Second World War, when the United States’ growing 
interest in the region’s oil resources coalesced with a realization about the regions’ 
geostrategic importance.   
The years 1941 to 1945, then, became a crucial formative period in the 
United States’ foreign policy towards Iran.  The United States was just beginning to 
emerge from a period of isolationism, and was beginning to explore the possibilities 
of developing its economic interests abroad.  Its oil companies were especially 
focused on Iran and the Middle East as a new source of income.  At the same time, in 
order to meet the taxing demands of the war effort, the United States began steadily 
to take over Great Britain’s military functions in Iran.  Because of its seaports and its 
proximity to the Soviet Union’s southern border, Iran took on significant military 
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importance during the war.  After it joined the war on the side of the Allies in 
December 1941, the United States established a military mission in Iran in order to 
ensure the successful shipment of war materiel and supplies into the Soviet Union.  
These few short years became a crucial turning point in the history of the United 
States’ presence in the Middle East.  With the exception of a handful of American 
missionaries, American military and diplomatic efforts in Iran during World War II 
proved to be the “first large-scale contact between Americans and Iranians.”1  
However, the American mission in Iran was neither straightforward nor simple: Iran 
was, in many ways, the victim of the competing interests of various American 
institutions.  As will later be elaborated, the particular military-strategic 
considerations of the war often stood in the way of long-term diplomatic 
advancements in Iran. 
 
I. Historical Context 
By the outbreak of the Second World War, Iranian ruler Reza Shah Pahlavi 
had developed close ties with Nazi Germany.  Despite the fact that Iran had 
officially declared neutrality, it maintained its strong economic contact with 
Germany, and even attempted to negotiate the opening of an overland transit 
route through Soviet territory in order to maintain trade relations.2  Germany 
saw the Near East as a “natural economic basin of German activity,” an idea 
expressed in its 1939 agreement with Italy to “divide the Near East into spheres 
                                                 
1 Kenneth M. Pollack.  The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America.  (New York: 
Random House, 2004), 40. 
2 Miron Rezun.  The Iranian Crisis of 1941; The Actors: Britain, Germany, and The Soviet Union.   
(Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1982), 36. 
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3 
of influence, according to which… Irak [sic] and Iran were to be conceded to the 
German sphere.”3  And the relationship was not merely one of trade: Reza Shah, 
on many occasions, expressed sympathy with the Nazi cause, and “there are 
stories told that it was the Iranian Embassy in Berlin that first suggested to Reza 
Shah in 1935 that he change the name of the country from ‘Persia’… to ‘Iran (land 
of the Aryans).’”4  The American Minister in Iran, Louis Dreyfus, expressed concern 
in March 1941 that “Iran’s foreign policy [is] opportunistic, extremely cautious as 
well as neutral, a policy which leaves the door open to cooperation and friendship 
with whichever belligerent is victorious.”5  Additionally, there was a physical 
German presence within Iranian borders: by 1941, Tehran had become home to 
over one thousand German officials and advisors.6  This presence intensified 
Soviet and British unease about the reliability of Iran and the threat posed to 
crucial oil refineries in the region.   
 Iran’s role in the war drastically changed during the summer of 1941.  In 
June, Germany launched an invasion deep into the Soviet Union, with one of its 
army groups, Army Group South, making a beeline towards the Baku oil fields in 
the Caucasus.  At this point in the war, the Soviet Union was in desperate need of 
supplies.  For the other Allies, keeping the Soviet Union involved in the war 
against Germany was crucial to the success of the entire war effort.  As long as 
the Soviets were keeping Adolf Hitler’s forces engaged in battle on the Eastern 
                                                 
3 Rezun, 33. 
4 Pollack, 37-38. 
5 National Archives at College Park (hereinafter NARA).  American Embassy, Tehran, Iran 1941.  
Record Group 84, MLR UD Entry 2737, Box 44. Telegram sent by Dreyfus dated March 14, 1941. 
6 James A. Bill. The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations. (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1998), 18. 
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Front, the pressure faced by Great Britain in the west was lessened.  However, 
with the Wehrmacht advancing through Soviet territory at an incredible pace, the 
Soviets could not indefinitely maintain a defense alone and without aid.  
Therefore, in October 1941, President Roosevelt signed his approval on a Lend-
Lease commitment to the Soviet Union, which became the first in a series of so-
called “protocols” specifying quantities and types of supplies that the United 
States would provide the Soviet Union over an agreed-upon period of time.  
According to military historian Robert W. Coakley,  
furnishing the supplies and the shipping in the end proved to be the 
less difficult part of the task of supplying the Russians; by mid-
1942 the central problem had become that of opening or keeping 
open routes of delivery over which these ships and supplies, made 
available at such sacrifice, could move to the U.S.S.R.7 
 
Three routes were identified for shipping supplies to the Soviet Union: the first 
across the Pacific to the Soviet port at Vladivostok and across the Trans-Siberian 
Railroad to the Eastern Front, the second north through the Soviet Arctic and 
into the ports at Murmansk and Archangel, and the third through Iran.  On this 
final route, American Lend-Lease supplies could be shipped into Iranian ports 
and transported north by train or truck through the Caucasus Mountains and 
into the Soviet Union.  However, in order to utilize Iran as a shipping route, the 
Allies would require the cooperation of local government.  After unsuccessful 
attempts to pressure the Shah into distancing himself from his German allies, the 
Soviet Union and Great Britain launched a joint invasion in August 1941, 
                                                 
7 Robert W. Coakley.  “The Persian Corridor as a Route for Aid to the USSR,” in Command Decisions, 
ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield.  (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959, pp. 154-181), 
157. 
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occupied Iran, and deposed the Reza Shah in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi.  After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and after it became clear that 
both Great Britain and the Soviet Union did not have the resources to maintain a 
presence in Iran while at the same time carry on other military campaigns, the 
United States joined its allies in occupying the country.  It eventually established 
a military mission of 30,000 noncombatant troops8 – the Persian Gulf Service 
Command, or the PGSC – under the direction of Major General Donald Connolly to 
oversee the transportation of nearly $18 billion in goods to the Soviet Union.9 
However useful its transportation program was, the United States did not 
intend to remain in occupation of Iran indefinitely.  Patrick J. Hurley, President 
Roosevelt’s personal emissary to the Middle East and the head of a mission to 
make a “low-profile survey of nationalist movements” throughout the region in 
late 1943, championed the cause of Iranian independence after the war, as 
outlined in the Atlantic Charter.10  To do this, Hurley “proposed investing 
massively in industrial and transportation systems in Iran and sending American 
experts to help it erect democratic institutions.”11  While Roosevelt was eager to 
adopt this foreign policy, he was checked by the concerns of the British and the 
Soviets.  The United States was still in need of its military allies, and so the policy 
of development and investment was set aside.  Instead, the United States 
attempted, according to policy analyst Kenneth Pollack, to 
                                                 
8 Noncombatant soldiers were given only minimal combat training.  Their primary purpose was to 
run the shipping operations, rather than to fight battles. 
9 Pollack, 40. 
10 Michael B. Oren. Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present.  
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 434. 
11 Oren, 456. 
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reassure the Iranians by seeking a joint declaration from all three 
Allied powers affirming that the takeover of Iran was temporary… 
this led to the January 1942 Tripartite Pact, in which the three 
allies guaranteed Iran’s territorial sovereignty and independence.  
In addition, to try and attach meaning to these guarantees, all three 
agreed to withdraw their troops from Iran no later than six months 
after the end of the war.12 
 
In the end, U.S. troops finally pulled out of Iran by January 1946.  
 
II. Developing a Cohesive Foreign Policy 
 
It is clear that the United States’ concerns in occupying Iran during World 
War II were not simply limited to the shipment of supplies north into the Soviet 
Union.  The United States was, during the war, beginning to shape a cohesive, 
long-term foreign policy towards Iran, and towards the Middle East as a whole.  
At the outset of the war, the United States had no clear, comprehensive policy 
towards the Middle East and Iran, and instead, according to Middle East historian 
Thomas Bryson, “the American State Department concentrated on implementing 
those policies supportive of the war effort.”13  However, the State Department 
gradually developed a distinct foreign policy – particularly potent with regards 
to Iran – over the course of the war, primarily due to the additional presence of 
both Great Britain and the Soviet Union, turning that country into a “veritable 
political cockpit.”14  Beyond the immediate priority given to the war effort, the 
United States increasingly sought to hinder British imperialist ambitions (as a 
part of a larger trend of US ascendancy over British influence in the Middle East 
                                                 
12 Pollack, 41. 
13 Thomas A. Bryson.  Seeds of Mideast Crisis: The United States Diplomatic Role in the Middle East 
During World War II. (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1981), 49. 
14 Bryson, 48. 
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as a whole), to support American oil companies in their quest for regional oil 
concessions, and to impede Soviet aspirations in Iran.  Historian Mansour 
Bonakdarian claims that this policy was unified and influenced by the economic 
and material damage suffered by Great Britain during the war: “[in] light of 
Britain’s depleted economic and military resources and the strengthened Soviet 
position in Iran during the war, the American State Department would actively 
explore possible means of containing Soviet influence in Iran even before the war 
came to a close.”15  All of these foreign policy goals involved bolstering Iranian 
sovereignty, and supporting an Iranian government friendly to the United States. 
U.S. military efforts, however, proved in many ways to be a major 
impediment to the United States’ long-term diplomatic goals in the region.  For 
example, while throughout the war, Iranian officials tried to keep the United 
States militarily and politically involved in their country as an impediment to 
British and Soviet ambitions, “the evidence suggests that many average Iranians 
would have preferred that the Americans get out.  U.S. military personnel showed 
little cultural sensitivity and often treated the Iranians as impediments to their 
mission.”16  PGSC transport monopolized the roads and railroads of Iran, which 
created a great impediment to domestic trade, and especially to the movement of 
food.  In 1942, Iran suffered from a bad harvest, and the widespread famine, 
paired with the influx of 30,000 American troops, led to violent bread riots and 
widespread discontent.  While the United States attempted to address the 
                                                 
15 Bonakdarian, Mansour.  “Great Expectations: U.S.-Iranian Relations, 1911-1951,” in U.S.-Middle 
East Historical Encounters, ed. Abbas Amanat and Magnus T. Bernhardsson. (Tallahassee: 
University Press of Florida, 2007, pp. 121-141), 129. 
16 Pollack, 41. 
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problem using Allied supplies in the country, they met with “considerable 
resistance from the Russians and the British, who cared little about the welfare 
of the Iranians,” which was perhaps because they lacked the long-term ambitions 
in the region that the United States was developing.  As the war progressed, the 
American Office of Strategic Services station in Tehran “constantly reported that 
the Iranian people were… increasingly pro-Nazi, with crowds cheering Hitler’s 
appearance in newsreels.”17  These reports eventually began to alarm the State 
Department, which began to express concern that perhaps the War Department 
should not be conducting its transportation efforts without thought given to the 
long-term repercussions of the way in which it was conducting those efforts.  If 
the PGSC, for example, were to not entirely monopolize Iranian roads and 
railways, perhaps popular opinion of the United States would not be so greatly 
damaged, and U.S. long-term interests would be more effectively protected. 
 
III. Argument 
This thesis will examine the interaction of the United States’ military policy – 
and military considerations involving supporting the Eastern Front – with US 
foreign policy and foreign policy considerations in Iran during the Second World 
War.  During the period from 1941-1945, the War and State departments each had 
its own agenda in Iran.  More often than not, as these agendas were implemented, 
they came into conflict with one another.  Would Iran become a partner in America’s 
quest to develop the economic potential of the region, or would America risk those 
friendly relations with Iran in order to achieve its more immediate military aims?  
                                                 
17 Pollack, 43. 
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The struggle that played out between these policies over the course of the war 
eventually decided the nature of the United States’ ultimate relationship with Iran 
during that period.  The conflicting demands of the war effort and long-term 
political considerations often caused a great deal of friction both among 
policymakers in Washington and in the Middle East and Europe, as well as a great 
deal of contradiction and discord among the policies themselves.  This thesis will 
engage in an in-depth study of those frictions that developed among the policies of 
the War and State Departments, as a result of the conflicting demands of the war 
effort and long-term political considerations.  
Because of the nature of this in-depth study, my argument will be organized 
thematically, rather than chronologically.  This is a complicated topic – there were 
many factors that played a role not only in the development of the United States’ 
foreign policy towards Iran, but that also played a role in complicating the 
relationship between the United States’ foreign and military policies regarding Iran 
during the war.  I will therefore structure my discussion using three main organizing 
ideas: First, I will discuss the rise of US foreign policy interests and influence in Iran 
against the backdrop of British decline.  This initial chapter will demonstrate how 
the war demands brought the United States into greater involvement with Iran both 
militarily and diplomatically, and how the United States’ military involvement 
eventually embittered American-Iranian relations.  The next chapter will then 
elaborate upon the military issues that brought the United States into closer contact 
with Iran – including the use of Iran and the Persian Corridor as a route for military 
aid to Soviet Russia – and the anxieties that arose from aiding a potential future 
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enemy.  The reason that the United States established a military presence in the 
region had more to do with supporting the Soviet Union than with Iran itself, which 
accounts for the disconnect between American foreign and military policies 
regarding Iran.  It is therefore important, in a study of American policies towards 
Iran during this period, to understand the issues and policy conflicts surrounding 
the United States’ support of the Soviet Union.  Finally, the third chapter will draw 
upon the previous two chapters to illustrate how  those tensions within the United 
States government, as related to Iran, promoted conflict among U.S. military and 
diplomatic institutions, officers, and personnel on the ground. 
It is clear that the United States’ concerns in occupying Iran during World 
War II were not simply limited to the shipment of supplies north into the Soviet 
Union.  The United States was, during the war, just beginning to shape a cohesive, 
long-term foreign policy towards Iran, and towards the Middle East as a whole.  
During this period, then, the United States needed to do what almost all nations 
must do during a time of war: it needed to balance its own competing interests in 
Iran by working to ensure a speedy victory at minimal human and financial cost, 
while all the while keeping in mind that its military efforts could very well 
disrupt its long-term diplomatic interests in the region. 
Because this period marked the first time that the United States showed a 
prolonged, deep-seated, comprehensive interest in the Middle East, it is important 
to understand what factors most influenced its early relations with the countries of 
that region.  The United States’ relationship with Iran in the twentieth century has 
historically been a rocky one, with roots that lie in this period from 1942-1945.  The 
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policies that the United States developed towards Iran during this early period and 
the influences of World War II on the formation of those policies can help shed light 
on the general history of American-Iranian relations.  The implications of this first 
prolonged engagement in Iran and the Middle East are far-reaching, as we are all too 
aware of today.
The Setting Sun of the British Empire: Rising US Interests in Iran 
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I. The Setting Sun of the British Empire: 
Rising US Interests in Iran 
 
 
 In this chapter, I will discuss the factors in the development of the United 
States’ foreign policy towards Iran during World War II.  I will illustrate how the 
demands of the war effort brought the United States into greater involvement with 
Iran, and facilitated the shift from a disinterested foreign policy to an active, 
forward-thinking policy.  At the same time, however, the war effort presented many 
complications and difficulties to the successful realization of U.S. foreign policy goals 
in Iran.  By the end of the war, the increased influence of the United States in Iran 
and Iranian affairs somewhat embittered American-Iranian relations.  This 
encroachment upon Iranian sovereignty eventually compelled Iran to pull back from 
its original reliance on American assistance, and take its foreign affairs into its own 
hands. 
The United States was, during the war, just beginning to shape a cohesive, 
long-term foreign policy towards Iran, and towards the Middle East as a whole.  
At the outset of the war, the United States had no clear, comprehensive policy 
towards the Middle East and Iran, and instead, according to Middle East historian 
Thomas Bryson, “the American State Department concentrated on implementing 
those policies supportive of the war effort.”1  However, the State Department 
gradually developed a distinct foreign policy – particularly potent with regards 
to Iran – over the course of the war.  This was primarily due to the additional 
                                                 
1 Bryson, 49. 
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presence in Iran of both Great Britain and the Soviet Union, turning that country 
into a “veritable political cockpit.”2  Beyond the immediate priority given to the 
war effort, the United States increasingly sought to hinder British imperialist 
ambitions3, to support American oil companies in their quest for regional oil 
concessions, and to bolster Iranian sovereignty. 
 
I. The Rising Primacy of the United States in Iran 
 According to historian Mansour Bonakdarian, until the early 1940s, the 
United States’ main concern with Iran was “with the well-being of American 
Presbyterian missionaries who had been arriving [there] since the 1830s.”4  Though 
it maintained a diplomatic presence to support the American missionaries, pilgrims, 
and merchants who traveled there, the United States did not have particularly 
strong economic interests or imperialist ambitions in the region.  Instead, the United 
States simply conformed to the policies of Great Britain, especially after World War 
I.  For Britain, the Middle East was a key strategic location from which to protect its 
interests in India.  Therefore, if Britain did not consider Iran to be of particular 
importance in and of itself, it was still seen as a crucial strategic stronghold from a 
geomilitary perspective.  The United States, on the other hand, gave “tempered and 
tacit recognition of Iran as a sphere of British ascendancy” after the Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917, believing that it could rely on the strength of Great Britain to 
                                                 
2 Bryson, 48. 
3 As a part of a larger trend of US ascendancy over British influence in the Middle East as a 
whole. 
4 Bonakdarian, 15. 
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protect Iran from the influence of Communism.5  This policy of conformity to the 
status-quo of British policy in the region continued through the interwar period and 
into the early 1940s, despite the fact of growing American economic interests in 
Iranian oil fields.  American oil companies had begun to explore the possibility of oil 
concessions during the interwar period, yet “few in the United States expressed any 
desire to see their country either replace or support Great Britain [militarily or 
politically].  Americans still believed that they could undermine Britain’s economic 
position without having to accept any political or military responsibilities.”6  As a 
nation which still retained many of its isolationist and non-interventionist 
tendencies, inter-war America shied away from competing with Britain’s diplomatic 
and military clout in the region.  Even when the United States became embroiled in 
World War II and joined its British allies in supporting shipping efforts through Iran, 
Great Britain initially held the upper hand and dictated policy.  Harry L. Hopkins, a 
diplomatic advisor to President Roosevelt, wrote in a memorandum regarding the 
Middle East: 
British officials never fail to emphasize by word and deed Empire 
interests in the Middle East.  The Middle Eastern Theater of 
operations is referred to and treated by them as an exclusive British 
theater.  American activity is almost resented…. Unfortunately 
American Policy in the Middle East has not retained a separate 
identity.7 
 
 The United States’ neutrality policy, which had theretofore encouraged its 
abstention from actively developing a foreign policy towards the Middle East, came 
                                                 
5 Bonakdarian, 18. 
6 Michael A. Palmer.  Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 
1833-1992. (New York: Free Press, 1992). 20. 
7 Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library (hereinafter FDR).  Hopkins, Harry L.  Box 332, Book 8 - 
Interest in Middle East. 
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to an abrupt end with the onset of World War II and the beginning of US material 
support of the Allies through the Lend-Lease program.  After Britain and the Soviet 
Union occupied Iran and opened the Persian Corridor, a transportation system was 
set into place, allowing Great Britain to move Lend-Lease supplies through Iran and 
into Soviet hands.  While the United States would not formally enter the war for 
another few months, it still maintained a vested interest in the success of the Allied 
nations, and consequently in the success and efficiency of the war efforts in the 
Middle East.  In September 1941, the U.S. Military Iranian Mission, led by Colonol 
Raymond A. Wheeler, was established to facilitate transportation efforts through the 
Persian Corridor (this military mission would later become the Persian Gulf Service 
Command).  Yet, even with its own established troops in the region, the United 
States could not easily dictate policy or control transportation efforts.  In a 
confidential telegram from Cairo, Admiral Alan Kirk wrote to the United States 
Secretary and Under-Secretary of State complaining about the “absence of unified 
command and the lack of coordination among the various services [that] have 
resulted in a restriction of the Middle Eastern achievements of the British armed 
forces and of the efficacy of the war effort.”8  Knowing that it was ultimately Great 
Britain that held sway over the politics and logistics of transportation through Iran, 
the most that Kirk could recommend that the United States do was encourage 
reforms in the British war machine.   
In 1942, the American role in Iran and the Middle East began to undergo a 
drastic change.  Until July of that year, American supplies had primarily been 
                                                 
8 FDR.  Hopkins, Harry L.  Box 326, Book 7 - Middle East Politics and Requirements. 
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shipped to the Soviet Union over two main convoy routes: one through Iran and the 
Persian Corridor, and the other through the Soviet Arctic and into Soviet ports at 
Murmansk and Archangel.  However, when the northern convoys came under 
serious strain due to unfavorable weather conditions and German interference, 
the Allies turned to the Persian Gulf “as the only important alternative for 
forwarding war supplies to the U.S.S.R.  The Russians… asked that not only planes 
and trucks but all sorts of military equipment in the largest quantities possible come 
via the southern route.”9  Traffic through the Persian Corridor would have to be 
increased drastically.  However, with its resources stretched after three years of 
war, its troops fighting the German forces in North Africa, and the demanding 
preparations for the cross-channel invasion then proposed for 1943, Britain was 
beginning to feel the strain of maintaining its military presence in Iran.   
Both British and American resources were “under heavy strain to meet even 
the minimum requirements of their own forces,”10 and yet the United States 
emerged as the nation best equipped to deal with the additional burden placed onto 
the southern route.  On July 13, 1942, Franklin Roosevelt forwarded to Winston 
Churchill a recommendation that in order to expand transit facilities in Iran, the U.S. 
Army should take over operation and control of the Trans-Iranian Railway in 
southern Iran, and “Churchill accepted the proposal immediately with some 
enthusiasm.” 11  One month later, after receiving recommendations for precisely 
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how the United States would take over shipping efforts, Churchill wrote to 
Roosevelt: 
I therefore welcome and accept your most helpful proposal contained 
in your telegram, that the railway be taken over, developed and 
operated by the United States Army; with the railroad should be 
included the ports of Khorramshahr and Bandar Shapur… The railway 
and ports would be managed entirely by your people, though the 
allocation of traffic would have to be retained in the hands of the 
British military authorities for whom the railway is an essential 
channel of communication for operational purposes.12 
 
At this point, the United States Army immediately began to expand its presence and 
efficacy in Iran.  In a booklet issued on September 3, 1942 entitled, Plan for 
Operation of Certain Iranian Communication Facilities between Persian Gulf Ports and 
Tehran by US Army Forces, a request by the commanding officer of the USAFIME (the 
United States Forces in the Middle East) for further resources is detailed: “He 
requests certain troops to operate the railroads and the ports.  He also requests a 
large amount of railroad equipment in addition to that set up for the railroad under 
Lend-Lease.  In addition, he desires to establish truck supply routes for which he 
requires troops and a large number of trucks.”13  Over the next year, the United 
States’ military involvement in Iran would expand to such an extent, that it would 
end up maintaining a total presence of 30,000 noncombatant troops in the region. 
 Now that Great Britain and the United States were cooperating on shipping 
efforts in southern Iran, problems and difficulties associated with the division of 
military responsibility and combined strategy began to present themselves, mainly 
                                                 
12 Quoted in: Motter, T.H. Vail.  The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia.  (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1952.) 190. 
13 FDR. President's Soviet Protocol Committee.  Box 25, Plan for Operation of Certain Iranian 
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associated with the increasingly differing objectives of the two countries.  Due to its 
imperialist interests in the region, Britain was primarily interested in bolstering the 
security of Iran against enemy attack and internal unrest, while the United States 
remained focused on the objective of “increasing and insuring the uninterrupted 
flow of supplies to Russia.” 14  With this in mind, the Anglo-American Combined 
Chiefs of Staff issued the following statement: “It is definitely understood that the 
British control of priorities and allocations must not be permitted to militate against 
attainment of such objective [i.e. the objective of shipping supplies to Russia], 
subject always to the military requirements for preparing to meet a threat to the 
vital Persian Gulf oil areas.”15  This recognition of the difference in objectives 
thereby allowed the United States even greater control over the allocation of goods 
within Iran, and further freed it from the dictates of British policy.  The war 
demands were simply more pressing, and therefore, unless an imminent security 
threat to the region presented itself, the United States’ objectives would maintain 
primacy, and the U.S. military could focus its energies entirely on the goal of 
shipping aid to the Soviet Union. 
The proposal of the Combined Chiefs of Staff marked an important change for 
the United States.  At this point, U.S. military policy towards the region began to 
diverge from that of Great Britain’s.  U.S. policymakers began to become concerned 
about developing the United States’ own reputation in the Middle East, separate 
from Britain’s, and about what the U.S. considered to be Britain’s misappropriate 
allocations of Lend-Lease materials.  The State Department in particular was 
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concerned that Great Britain had been abusing Lend-Lease privileges:  In a 
December 1943 report to President Roosevelt, Brigadier General Patrick Hurley 
complained that “Britain has been giving and now Russia is about to give [to Iran] 
our lend lease supplies or supplies that have been replaced or released by our lend 
lease supplies, to other nations in return for concessions or to strengthen their own 
ideologies in the countries to which supplies are given.”16  One of the reasons that 
the State Department was so concerned with this issue was because it believed that 
Lend-Lease could be “a potent instrument in international relations.”17  If nations 
receiving Lend-Lease aid knew that they were receiving it directly from the United 
States, then there would be a much greater positive impact on American prestige 
worldwide than if Great Britain were distributing that same aid.  Additionally, if U.S. 
aid were not being distributed by Great Britain, then the United States’ reputation 
would not suffer damage by being associated with any unpopular British policies.  In 
the meantime, however, “the administration of Lend-Lease in the Middle East [had] 
been characterized as inefficient and injurious to American prestige,” because “the 
British [were] using American lend lease and American troops not for the purpose 
of creating a brave new world based on the Atlantic Charter… but for British 
conquest, British imperialist rule, and British trade monopoly.”18  Therefore, Harry 
Hopkins, Roosevelt’s personal advisor, believed that the resources could be more 
efficiently used if “the policy making and direction of lend lease be placed 
                                                 
16 FDR.  Roosevelt, Franklin D. Papers as President, President's Secretary's File.  Box 40, Iran 
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17 FDR.  Hopkins, Harry L.  Box 332, Book 8 - Interest in Middle East. 
18 FDR.  Roosevelt, Franklin D. Papers as President, President's Secretary's File.  Box 40, Iran 
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exclusively and in actuality under proper civilian authority in the State Department,” 
and if “all operations pertaining to distribution of lend lease goods in foreign 
territory be transferred to the United States Army.”19   
 
II. Positive Equilibrium and Iranian Sovereignty 
Historian Michael Palmer writes that during the transitional period in 1942, 
“as Americans became increasingly aware of Great Britain’s incapacity, the strategic 
significance of the Middle East, and the importance of access to the oil in the Persian 
Gulf during the war, and perhaps after as well, they began reassessing longstanding 
United States policies toward the region.”20  It was during this period that the United 
States began to increasingly obstruct both British and Soviet imperialist objectives 
in the region, and to support Iranian aspirations for national sovereignty. 
An important theme during the war was Iran’s insistence on maintaining the 
integrity of its national sovereignty.  Even before the outbreak of hostilities, Iran had 
long suffered from the pressure of both Soviet and British influence, breeding an 
intense domestic hostility against those nations.  As an outlet to the Persian Gulf, 
Iran had been a point of contention between the Soviet Union and Great Britain for 
more than a hundred years.  For Britain, controlling the Persian Gulf meant 
protecting the waterways to India, the crown jewel of the Empire.  From the point of 
view of the Iranian government, its country was the victim of constant attack: 
During an interview with American diplomat Wendell Willkie, the Prime Minister of 
Iran stressed that “for years Great Britain had tried to colonize Iran and Russia to 
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gobble up Iran.”21  A British memo issued by the Coordinator of Information office in 
December 1941 describes some of the origins of Iranian hostility to the British and 
the Soviets:  
In 1907 the first partition of Iran into ‘spheres of influence’ between 
Great Britain and Russia reduced Iran to the equivalent of three vassal 
states.  As a result, Iranians neglected internal reform and 
concentrated their attention on an intense hatred of Russia and 
Britain.  Further experience with major powers came to Iran during 
the war of 1914-18.  Iranian neutrality was repeatedly violated, and 
Iran suffered all the horrors of war with none of the compensations 
allowed the victors.  After the war, Lord Curzon drew up an Anglo-
Iranian treaty so one-sided in favor England that riots took place in 
Iran and their Assembly failed to pass the bill.22 
 
Britain was well aware that its own imperialistic and poorly implemented policies 
had much to do with the bitterness and hostility they were experiencing as they 
attempted to coordinate shipping through the Persian Corridor.  The joint invasion 
by the Soviet Union and Great Britain in August 1941 and the subsequent abdication 
of Reza Shah Pahlavi not only served to exacerbate those hostilities, but also 
encouraged the determination of the Iranian Government to seek assurances from 
the Allied nations that after the war, Iranian territorial sovereignty would be 
respected. 
Even before the United States’ official entry into the war, Iran turned to the 
U.S. immediately upon its invasion by the Soviet Union and Great Britain.  As the 
invasion progressed, Reza Shah Pahlavi telegraphed President Roosevelt, pleading 
for assistance.  While Roosevelt’s response expressed sympathy for Pahlavi’s plight 
and support for Pahlavi’s determination to protect his nation’s sovereignty, it also 
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remained carefully neutral, indicating implicit support for the Soviet Union and 
Britain’s actions: “I hope your Majesty will concur with me in believing that we must 
view the situation in its full perspective of present world events and 
developments.”23  This lackluster support, however, did not deter later attempts by 
Reza Shah’s son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, to solicit American support for 
Iranian sovereignty.  In a 1944 memorandum on American foreign policy in Iran, 
Persian Gulf Command Major General Donald Connolly wrote that Iran “would 
welcome the intervention of American forces to defend her sovereignty against the 
encroachments of Russia and England.”24 
Two primary reasons can be attributed to this support for American 
intervention in Iran.  The first was a genuine belief that while the United States had 
long-term economic and trade interests in Iran, it did not have any territorial 
ambitions in the region.  Particularly towards the beginning of the war, United 
States had gained a reputation – both within Iran and world-wide – as a champion of 
freedom and national self-determination.  American policymakers were aware that 
this trusting opinion of the United States was beneficial to the war effort.  They 
recognized that the United States could use its own positive image – as a nation 
without territorial ambitions in Iran, and which touted the values of national self-
determination  – as leverage to ease any Iranian insecurities about allowing 
Americans to control their ports, roads, and railways.  As Louis Dreyfus noted early 
in 1941, immediately after the U.S. government approved a bill that would provide 
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Lend-Lease aid to Iran, “[the] Iranian people has sympathy for the American policy 
of assisting nations which are fighting for their existence… Officials of Government 
feel that the legislation may be used as a lever to get approval for the exportation 
from the United States of war materials which are much needed, since aggression 
threatens Iran.”25   
As it turns out, Dreyfus was only somewhat correct in his assertions.  It took 
the invasion of Iran a few months later for American material to begin flowing to the 
Soviet Union through the Persian Corridor.  However, American generosity towards 
Iran did not go unnoticed, and in fact improved American prestige in Iran over that 
of the Soviet Union and Britain.  As policy analyst Kenneth Pollack writes: “A variety 
of Iranian officials, believing the United States to be benign and uninterested in 
Iranian affairs, pleaded with American administrators and diplomats to evict the 
Soviets and British from Iran and simply run the Lend-Lease operations 
themselves.”26  While it was clear to Iran that Great Britain and the Soviet Union had 
much to gain by maintaining control over the Persian Corridor and Persian Gulf, it 
was much easier to swallow the idea that the United States’ only interests in Iran 
were based on the achievement of its war aims and the eventual development of 
trade relations in the area.  If America were to entirely take over the shipping 
operations, it would be much less likely to prolong its military presence in the 
country after the cessation of hostilities.  The United States, in turn, was concerned 
with maintaining this positive reputation.  As the close of the war drew near, 
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discussion began amongst the Allies about an international trusteeship over Iranian 
Railways and the establishment of a free port on the Persian Gulf.  American 
policymakers knew, however, that an attempt by the United States to extend its 
power in Iran beyond anything concerned strictly with the war effort could 
potentially backfire.  In a January 1945 memorandum, Acting Secretary of State 
Joseph Grew explained to President Roosevelt that “no matter how drawn up or 
proposed, the plan would appear to Iran, and doubtless to the world, as a thinly 
disguised cover for power politics and old-world imperialism.”27  Because the 
United States did in fact entertain foreign policy interests in Iran aside from its war 
aims, it was important that (in an ironic twist of logic) it maintain the appearance of 
altruistic intervention. 
The second reason behind Iranian support for American intervention had 
much more to do with realpolitik considerations.  In an article discussing the history 
of American-Iranian diplomatic relations, Mansour Bonakdarian postulates that 
Iranian nationalist aspirations facilitated extensive U.S. intervention in the region 
because the Iranian government pursued a policy of “‘positive equilibrium’ or the 
‘third power strategy,’ which consisted of playing the great powers against one 
another for preserving Iran’s independence.”28  Iran was not itself a strong enough 
power to hold much clout against invaders with imperialist intentions; however, it 
could take advantage of strategic alliances for its own benefit.  Iran therefore 
exerted significant effort during the war to develop and strengthen its relations with 
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the United States – often by invoking American commitment to self-determination of 
nations – in order to undermine British and Soviet influence, both during and 
immediately after the war.  In a description of the September 1942 meeting between 
Wendell Willkie and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Ambassador Louis Dreyfus 
wrote that, in a show of defiance and independence, the Shah stated that he wanted 
“to build up his army so that it would be able to defend Iran against the Axis if they 
reached its frontiers.  He thought there would be time for such preparations and 
that he would in the meantime endeavor to bring about an alliance with the Turks 
for a mutual defense pact.  He said he had already broached the subject to the 
Turkish Ambassador.”29  Iran was clearly willing to play the power politics game in 
order to manipulate the great powers into respecting Iranian sovereignty, and 
would make outside bilateral alliances if need be.  
Iran also managed to secure commitments from the Soviet Union and Great 
Britain that they would, to an extent, respect Iranian sovereignty – and often relied 
upon the United States to encourage that those promises be met.  In January 1942, 
after the Soviet Union and Great Britain had occupied Iran, the three nations signed 
a Treaty of Alliance, which committed Iran not only to consent to Allied military 
presence within its borders, but also to provide nonmilitary assistance to the war 
effort.  Yet the treaty also committed the Allies to pull its troops out of Iran by, at the 
latest, six months after the conclusion of the war.  Additionally, at the Tehran 
Conference in December 1943, Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt signed the 
Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran.  In this document, the Allies not 
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only recognized the sacrifices that Iran had been making on behalf of the war effort, 
but also pledged post-war economic assistance to Iran, and declared their desire to 
help Iran maintain its “independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”30  
Through the rest of World War II, the Iranian government never ceased to remind 
the United States of the Allies’ commitment to supporting Iranian territorial 
sovereignty at the conclusion of the war.  A letter from the Iranian Ambassador to 
President Truman, written six months after the conclusion of the war in Europe, 
illustrated this sentiment: “I earnestly beg you, Mr. President, to continue to stand 
up for the rights of Iran[…] Your country alone can save us, for you have always 
defended moral ideas and principles and your hands are clean[…] The only solution 
[is…] immediate and simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and British forces from Iran 
and insistence on allowing Iran to have a free hand in her own territory.”31  That 
same month, upon presenting his letters of credence as the newly appointed Iranian 
Ambassador to the United States, Hussein Ala remarked that  
Iran has been the Bridge of Victory over which enormous quantities of 
American and British war material and supplies reached the U.S.S.R. 
with clockwork precision, hastening the defeat of our common foe.  
The valuable help furnished by my country in the prosecution of the 
war was duly recognized in the Declaration of Teheran… That 
important document also provides for economic assistance to Iran in 
the postwar period and, above all, affirms that the three allied powers 
‘are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the 
maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Iran’… It is the confident expectation of Iran that the 
Declaration of Tehran will be implemented and her territory 
completely evacuated by the occupying foreign forces whose 
                                                 
30 Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran, December 1, 1943. 
31 NARA. Record Group 59, Central Decimal Files; 1945-1949, File #701.9111; Iranian Diplomatic 
Representation in the United States.  Letter from the Iranian Ambassador to President Truman, dated 
November 29, 1945.   
The Setting Sun of the British Empire: Rising US Interests in Iran 
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2009 
Naomi Rosenblatt, College ‘09 
 
27 
continued presence within the borders of an allied country has no 
justification.32 
 
Iran’s staunch and persistent reminders of the Allies’ promise to leave Iran after the 
war points to a certain degree of cynicism that those nations would keep to their 
promise.   
The United States, however, proved to be responsive to Iran’s demand for 
support of its right to territorial sovereignty.  The United States did not have any 
post-war territorial ambitions in Iran, but nevertheless was beginning to develop 
ambitions with regard to oil concessions and the development of trade relations.  
These ambitions could only be realized, however, so long as the United States 
remained in good standing with the Iranian government – and that involved 
developing a reputation as a selfless champion of Iranian rights.  In a letter to the 
Secretary of State, Roosevelt expressed his sentiments of being “rather thrilled with 
the idea of using Iran as an example of what we could do by an unselfish American 
policy. We could not take on a more difficult nation than Iran.”33  Again, it is clear 
here that the maintenance of American prestige was both a concern and a motivator 
of foreign policy.  The United States could hold more clout abroad if the 
international community perceived its intentions as selfless and noble, and would 
therefore be able to more easily negotiate treaties and trade arrangements.  
However, simply providing aid would not be enough to maintain American prestige.  
Harry Hopkins, one of President Roosevelt’s closest advisors, recognized the 
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importance of stepping lightly even in the giving of “unselfish” aid, lest Iran perceive 
the United States as meddlesome: “In our participation in the government of other 
nations, except as a military necessity, our operations must be limited by the fact 
that we are committed to the principle that governments derive their just powers 
from the consent of the government.”34  Thus, it was important that even the giving 
of military and economic aid be done in such a way as to uphold the principle of the 
Atlantic Charter, and to ensure that the control of Iran’s development was ultimately 
held in the hands of the Iranian government. 
American officials perceived U.S. policy in direct juxtaposition with British 
foreign policy, especially in light of the decline of British influence in the Middle East 
and rising U.S. primacy in the region.  It is clear in the documents coming out of the 
U.S. State Department that American officials believed that British interests in Iran 
had been imperialistic and selfish.  In contrast, those same officials claim that the 
United States’ policy towards Iran would follow the magnanimous rubric of the 
Atlantic Charter.  Members of the State Department were often apt to criticize the 
history of British influence in the region as both selfish and repressive: “Britain has 
supported whatever ruling class could achieve law and order… it has either 
maintained its own officials in power or frequently other corrupt and conservative 
regimes... [there has been] total neglect by Britain in the Middle East of such things 
as the promotion of education and public health.”  The poverty and backward 
development in Iran were blamed on the fact that Britain’s only interest in the 
region was in “maintaining its strategic dominance in the area… [and] keeping the 
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Russians away from the Persian Gulf.”35  American policymakers recognized that 
this sort of approach would only damage American prestige in Iran and hinder the 
United States’ ability to pursue its longterm diplomatic and economic goals in the 
region.  Therefore, American policymakers not only wanted to encourage Iranian 
perceptions of the United States as an altruistic nation, but also sought to actively 
develop a policy based on nation building.  In a 1944 memorandum on American 
Policy in the Middle East, it was reported to Roosevelt’s personal advisor, Harry 
Hopkins, that “a general objective of American policy should be to encourage the 
political independence of the Middle Eastern Governments,” which would be 
achieved through “lifting [the] level of the peoples of the Middle Eastern Countries.  
This is of importance, because it will help to counteract the political disturbances 
that arise from poverty and disease.” 36  By providing Lend-Lease aid and economic 
advisors to Iran during the war, and by promising economic aid for after the war, 
the United States would not only be improving the livelihood of average Iranian 
citizens, but would also be ensuring the internal strength of Mohammad Reza Shah 
Pahlavi’s regime.  American policy even took into account the importance of 
developing Iran’s military strength – this was a policy that both the War Department 
and the State Department agreed upon.  The 1944 memorandum stated that “an 
objective of United States Policy must relate to the promotion of law and order… the 
responsibility for internal security must be made to rest with the governments 
themselves.  We are beginning to pursue a policy along this line by furnishing 
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certain arms and equipment to these governments and by the military missions we 
have sent to Persia.”37  Among these missions were that of General Clarence Ridley, 
who consulted with the Iranian Army on organizational problems, and that of 
Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who advised the Iranian Gendarmerie (the military 
police force).38    The appearance of an “unselfish” foreign policy rubric would 
ensure the maintenance of positive American prestige both globally and within Iran, 
and thereby provide room for the United States to expand its influence abroad. 
American policymakers recognized that the United States would derive 
benefit from the development of a stronger Iranian regime.  By freeing Iran from 
Soviet and British influences and encouraging internal security and economic 
development, the United States could promote trade relations with Iran.  In the 
words of one American policymaker: “Another objective of American policy should 
be promoting the development of Middle East trade.  A certain desirability attaches 
to making the Middle East more self-sufficient.”39  Motivated by the spirit of an 
open-door policy, the United States could promote its own trade interests by 
checking Soviet and British imperialist ambitions in the region.  As historian 
Thomas Bryson writes,  
A long-range American policy toward Iran developed gradually during 
the war years.  As early as 1943, a position paper prepared by John D. 
Jernegan of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs suggested that the 
United States needed to take cognizance of the presence of Russia and 
Britain in Iran… Jernegan argued that the United States ‘ alone, is in a 
position to build up Iran to the point at which it will stand in need of 
neither British nor Russian assistance… we can hope to remove any 
excuse for a post-war occupation, partition, or tutelage of Iran… We 
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can work to make Iran self-reliant and prosporous, open to the trade 
of all nations and a threat to none.’ Jernegan’s proposals became the 
basis of Department policy in Iran.40 
 
Some policymakers even suggested that development of U.S.-Iranian relations be 
taken a step further – not only should the United States encourage Iran to open its 
borders to American trade, but the United States should also seek to direct the 
development and strengthening of the Iranian government “so that the basis of 
government will be broadened.”  The United States would benefit by encouraging a 
strong and self-sufficient government in “a part of the world which lies on one of the 
most important trade crossroads.”41  If the Middle East could be made into a stable 
region, then the United States would be able to encourage the development of trade 
relations with Iran and its neighbors. 
 At the same time, however, the United States recognized the need to temper 
its enthusiasm for the development of Iranian independence.  Until the cessation of 
hostilities, it was crucial for the sake of the Allied war effort that the Soviet Union 
and Great Britain remain involved with shipping efforts through Iran and with the 
maintenance of internal Iranian security (in order to protect those shipping efforts).  
It therefore did not seek to immediately expel or discourage the Soviet Union and 
Great Britain from remaining involved in the development of the Persian Corridor.  
Instead, the United States agreed to dispatch political, financial, and military 
missions to the Iranian government and military institutions.  In 1942, the Iranian 
government had submitted a formal request to the United States for the assignment 
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of a mission to improve the Iranian military in order to “insure the security of the 
country so that the troops of the Allied Nations could be returned for use elsewhere 
and secondly, for the defense of the country against the Axis powers if such defense 
is needed.”42  The American government consented: “the United States will furnish, 
upon invitation of the Iranian Government, expert advisors in any or all of the fields 
of government.”43  It was recognized that the goals of these missions would not be 
fully realized for a few years, so that while they would eventually equip Iran to 
assert its full sovereignty, it would not be entirely able to do so until after the 
conclusion of the war. 
 
III. Oil Concessions in U.S. Foreign Policy 
 One of the United States’ major foreign policy concerns in Iran during the war 
was the development of its international oil industry.  Not only was domestic 
demand for oil in the United States rapidly expanding during the war, but it was 
becoming abundantly clear that oil would play an increasingly important role in the 
development of the American economy.  During the war, oil was becoming an 
increasingly important factor in the shaping of post-war policy, and played a 
significant role in expanding U.S. interest in the Persian Gulf.  This newly increased 
interest in the Gulf was “based on a newly developed national petroleum policy for 
the postwar world formulated by the State Department in late 1943 and early 
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Overview of Willkie’s audience with the Prime Minister on September 16, 1942. 
43 FDR.  Roosevelt, Franklin D. Papers as President, President's Secretary's File.  Box 40, Iran 
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1944.”44  Through the national petroleum policy, American domestic petroleum 
reserves were to be conserved, while the American government and American oil 
companies facilitated the “substantial and orderly expansion of production in the 
Eastern Hemisphere sources of supply, principally in the Middle East.”45  This policy 
arose out of a growing concern over the threatened depletion of the Western 
Hemisphere’s oil reserves, and therefore of the increased need to find substantial oil 
reserves abroad, in places like Iran and Saudi Arabia.  As a result of this increasingly 
important economic focus on Iran, “a February 1944 PAW [Petroleum 
Administration for War] technical report labeled the Persian Gulf ‘the center of 
gravity’ for future oil development.”46  As the development of American petroleum 
interests in later decades showed, the PAW’s statement could not have been more 
prophetic. 
In addition to these long-term economic and trade concerns, the war effort 
had put an increasing strain on American oil supplies, necessitating the immediate 
development of new oil concessions abroad.  By exploiting new foreign sources of 
petroleum, the United States could both “increase production and refinery capacity 
during wartime, and… insure American participation in postwar overseas oil 
development.”47  Mid-war, in 1943, American oil companies Standard-Vaccum, 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Sinclair communicated with the State Department 
their intentions to negotiate oil concessions with the Iranian government.  They 
were supported in their efforts by the State Department.  As Cordell Hull told the 
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Standard-Vaccum company in November 1943, the State Department looked “with 
favor upon the development of all possible sources of petroleum.”48  Therefore, the 
American government took an active role in assisting with the negotiations by 
advocating for the oil concessions.  Because this “coincided with renewed attempts 
by Tehran to use oil as a bait for encouraging greater US involvement in Iran,” 
American oil companies were able to successfully negotiate short-term oil 
concessions.49 
 However, American-Iranian oil trade relations became increasingly 
complicated as the war wore on.  Throughout 1944, the Soviet government had been 
attempting unsuccessfully to negotiate oil concessions with Iran.  While Iran had the 
year before demonstrated its willingness to allow oil concessions to the United 
States, it was far less inclined to grant those rights to the Soviet Union, whose 
intentions were, as has been illustrated, suspect.  Soviet officials were, of course, 
exceedingly upset about the imbalance in oil concessions.  In October 1944, Soviet 
diplomat Sergei Kavtaradze complained that “if the Persian Government chose to 
grant a concession to the Americans in south-east Persia, they should give the 
Soviets a concession in the north”50  These sorts of compensations would regulate 
the balance of power in the region.  Iran, however, was intent on preventing the 
Soviet Union from gaining any sort of control over Iranian resources.  Therefore,  
on December 2, 1944, [Mohammad] Musaddiq suddenly proposed an 
oil bill in the Majlis [the Iranian Parliament] that forbid the 
government from granting any oil concessions without legislative 
approval… In effect, it guaranteed that no further oil concessions 
                                                 
48 FRUS, 1943. The Near East and Africa: Volume IV, 625-626. 
49 Bonakdarian, 27. 
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would be granted while Iran was an occupied country; when the 
occupation ended, the Majlis would determine the issue of 
concessions.51 
 
Through this legislation, not only was the Majlis flexing its muscle in the face of its 
Soviet occupier, but it was also asserting its ability to play the power politics game 
independently of the United States.  Suddenly, U.S. officials were faced with a 
situation in which Iran no longer relied upon its influence and generosity in order to 
hinder Soviet and British territorial ambitions.  Because it made use of its oil fields 
as negotiating tool, the legislation temporarily damaged American influence in Iran.  
In denying concessions to the Soviet Union, the Majlis proved that it was not entirely 
reliant upon outside support to fend off occupying forces and defend its right to 
territorial sovereignty.  For the past three years, the Iranian perception of the 
United States as a selfless power put the U.S. in a position to influence Iran’s 
economy and government.  The two countries had been using each other: Iran had 
used the United States to thwart British and Soviet ambitions, which had given the 
U.S. power to advance its own intentions in the region.   
Now, at the end of 1944, American oil companies were also barred from 
negotiating further oil concessions from Iran because of this legislation.  This was 
not simply in order to maintain a balance of power between the great powers, nor as 
a symbolic demonstration of fairness.  While, as has been discussed, the Iranian 
government believed to a certain extent that the United States could be trusted in its 
foreign policy intentions, it did not wholeheartedly trust that the United States 
would keep to its word and pull its own troops out of Iran by the deadline of six 
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months after the end of the war.  During the last few months of the war, nearly all 
Iranian diplomatic communications with the United States expressed the sentiment 
that Iran wished to be granted its territorial sovereignty.  In October 1945, after 
hostilities worldwide had ceased and American, British, and Soviet troops were in 
the process of withdrawing from Iran, a discussion was sparked among American 
policymakers over whether Seaboard Oil Company should be allowed to send a 
representative to Tehran to keep in touch with developments as the Majlis 
discussed reopening concession negotiations.  Among the many pros and cons that 
were discussed, American Ambassador to Iran, Wallace Murray, claimed that there 
was “considerable risk that premature discussions would prejudice the American 
position for negotiations later on…this is not an appropriate time to discuss the 
development of Iranian petroleum resources by an American company.”52  The 
Majlis eventually reopened negotiations for oil concessions in 1946.  In the 
meantime, however, there was a genuine concern in the American State Department 
that a wrong move on its part could damage future opportunities for oil concessions 
– a sentiment that not only reflected a degree of distrust of the United States by Iran, 
but also reflected how important Persian oil had become in the eyes of American 
policymakers. 
 Much had changed, then, since the beginning of the war.  Within the span of 
four years, American foreign policy towards Iran had shifted from an almost 
disinterested passivity to an intense, forward-thinking policy.  Much of this change 
was facilitated by the demands of the war effort – for example, by the necessity for 
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the United States to take over much of Great Britain’s role in the shipment of aid 
through the Persian Corridor.  At the same time, however, war demands 
complicated the United States’ ability to build its relationship with the Iranian 
government.  So long as hostilities continued, the United States was obligated to 
assist the Soviet Union, which meant it must encroach upon Iranian sovereignty – a 
policy which served to embitter American-Iranian relations, and which eventually 
drove Iran to pull back from its reliance upon American assistance in defending Iran 
from the Soviet Union and Great Britain’s imperialist ambitions.
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II. Aiding the Enemy: The Russian Bear 
at the Northern Border 
 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss in further detail the use of Iran and the Persian 
Corridor as a route for military aid to the Soviet Union, and the resulting tensions 
among the War and State Departments regarding aid to a potential future enemy.  
While on the one hand, the war effort demanded that the United States provide 
enough aid to the Soviet Union to stave off the German advance, on the other hand, 
the United States was just beginning to look ahead towards supporting a 
containment policy in what was predicted to become a bipolar postwar world.   
The initial reason that the United States established a military presence in 
Iran had more to do with militarily supporting the Soviet Union than with Iran itself, 
which largely accounts for the disconnect between American foreign and military 
policies regarding Iran.  Not only was the State Department concerned with 
maintaining friendly relations with Iran, but it also had a somewhat more forward-
looking approach towards the United States’ dealings with the Soviet Union.  The 
State Department recognized that in order to impede Soviet aspirations of territorial 
expansion in Iran, the United States needed to be protective of Iranian territorial 
sovereignty.  The common sentiment in the State Department, therefore, was that 
Iran should not be used as a land bridge for the transportation of goods to a nation 
which might later threaten Iran.  The War Department, on the other hand, was 
motivated primarily by its immediate policies of supporting the Soviet Union’s 
military efforts against Germany, and consequently thought it absolutely necessary 
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to maintain a military presence in Iran.  It is therefore important, in a study of 
American policies towards Iran during the war, to understand the issues and policy 
conflicts surrounding the United States’ support of the Soviet Union. 
 
I. The Military Necessity of Aiding the Soviet Union 
 In June 1941, Nazi Germany launched an attack, code-named Operation 
Barbarossa, deep into Soviet Russia.  Ill-prepared for the sudden invasion, Soviet 
troops suffered defeat after staggering defeat.  While the Nazi advance began to 
slow down in September, the situation in the Soviet Union was still critical.  The 
Allies recognized that the collapse of the Soviet Union would have a devastating 
effect on the Allied war effort, and therefore immediately began to seek out ways 
to buttress the Soviet army, and keep it fighting.  When the Soviet Union refused 
to allow its Allies to send troops to assist with the fighting, the Allies eventually 
agreed that they would support the USSR by providing it with war material.  As 
Henry Stimson, the United States’ Secretary of War, wrote to President Roosevelt 
in February 1944: “Russia continues to be a major factor in achieving the defeat 
of Germany.  We must therefore continue to support the USSR by providing the 
maximum amount of supplies which can be delivered to her ports.”1 
 One major threat that Operation Barbarossa posed to the Allied war effort 
was the steady advance of German Army Group South towards the Baku oil fields 
in the Caucasus.  As the German army advanced further east, its supply lines 
were stretched almost to the breaking point – all that would change, however, if 
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the Germans controlled these valuable natural resources further afield.  The loss 
of access to these oil fields would at once be devastating for the Red Army, and 
would provide the German Wehrmacht with renewed strength with which to 
continue its attack further east into the Soviet Union, or south into the Middle 
East.  The security of the Soviet Union, then, was not the only concern created by 
the German advance: as British Brigadier J.M. Whiteley pointed out in a 1941 
memorandum: “The oil bearing areas in Roumania, the Caucasus, Iraq and Iran are 
within, or within striking distance of, the Middle East.”2  Great Britain was 
concerned with the security of the Middle East not only out of its own imperialist 
interests, but also out of a geo-military concern shared with the rest of its allies.  A 
letter by Brig. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, who supervised American military activities 
in Cairo, pointed to the Allies’ anxieties about a potential Nazi incursion into the 
Middle East and about the potential fall of the Soviet Union: 
Were Germany to take the Middle East, interrupt the Basra-Caspian 
Sea supply line, so great would be the victory that she would be 
justified in spending another winter in Russia.  The effect of another 
winter of war on Russia is likely to be tragic… If in 1943 the Red Army 
quits, a clean cut Allied victory would take years and is next to 
impossible.  The fate of the Middle East marks the turning point of the 
war.  Once lost, the Middle East can scarcely be regained.3 
 
While the last comment, that the fall of the Middle East would doom the entire 
war effort, is Maxwell’s personal opinion, there were others.  The War 
Department Chief of Staff, for example, believed that the Allies could continue 
fighting even if the Middle East and North Africa fell to the Germans.  
                                                 
2 FDR. Hopkins, Harry L.  Box 326, Book 7 - Middle East Politics and Requirements. 
3 FDR. Roosevelt, Franklin D. Papers as President, Map Room File.  Box 167, Naval Aide’s Files, A/16-3 
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Nevertheless, it was clear that if the Wehrmacht were to take control over the 
Caucasus and Middle East oil fields, the Allies would suffer a tremendous blow.  
 It was with these worries in mind – both regarding the need to ship 
supplies to the Soviet Union, and regarding the security of the Middle East itself – 
that Great Britain and the Soviet Union launched this joint invasion of Iran in late 
August 1941.  Now, the Allies could depend upon their own military forces to 
protect the Middle East and its oil fields, and could develop a viable route 
through which to ship weapons, ammunitions, food, clothing, and building 
supplies to the Red Army.  In October 1941, Roosevelt signed his approval on a 
Lend-Lease commitment to the USSR, which became the first in a series of so-
called “Soviet Protocols” specifying exact quantities and types of supplies that 
the United States would provide the Soviet Union over an agreed-upon period of 
time.  These goods were transferred to Great Britain, which initially took primary 
responsibility for transporting them to the Soviet Union.  However, the British 
development of the supply route through Iran was crude at best, and was 
plagued with management and coordination problems.  When the United States 
officially joined the Allies in December 1941 Henry Stimson wrote a letter to 
President Roosevelt, calling for the establishment of a military presence in Iran 
to assist with shipping efforts.  In the letter, Stimson stressed that the “prompt 
development of the supply route through the Persian corridor is a matter of great 
urgency due to (a) the critical need of the USSR for large quantities of material 
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which can only be shipped over this route, and (b) the necessity for establishing and 
supplying united military forces in this area.”4   
It soon became clear, however, that simply providing the supplies was not 
enough.  Because Great Britain could not handle the transportation efforts through 
Iran, by mid-1942, the United States replaced Great Britain as the primary 
transporter of goods to the Soviet Union through Iran.  In April 1942, what had 
previously been an advisory mission to shipment efforts – the U.S. Military 
Iranian Mission – was renamed the Iran-Iraq Service Command, and began to 
report to the Cairo headquarters of the U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East.  The 
mission was given its final name, the Persian Gulf Service Command, in August 
1941, and began to report directly to the War Department in Washington, DC, in 
December 1943. 
It was not clear at the outset of the war, however, that the Persian 
Corridor would be the primary route through which the Allies would ship 
supplies to the Soviet Union.  For quite some time, there had been debates about 
the relative merits and pitfalls of the so-called northern and southern routes.  
The northern route involved the transportation of supplies by ship north through 
the Soviet Arctic and into the ports at Murmansk and Archangel.  This route, 
however, faced quite a number of perils.  First, during the winter months, Allied 
ships had to navigate the treacherous ice floes that littered the Norwegian and 
Barents seas.  Then, during the spring and summer months, Allied ships were 
vulnerable to naval attacks by German U-Boats.  Nevertheless, in 1941, “the major 
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effort was devoted to forwarding supplies to the Russians over the more venerable 
northern Atlantic route.”  This was perhaps due to the fact that Great Britain did not 
have enough resources to support fully the significantly longer supply route through 
Iran, and because “the Russians insisted on the use of the northern route, evidently 
both because it promised quicker delivery of supplies closer to their fighting fronts 
and because they feared the establishment, in Iran, of a strong British or American 
position so close to the Soviet border.”5  However, it eventually became clear that 
the northern route was simply too perilous to be a viable shipping option.  As a 1943 
article in the Chicago Sun, discussing the potential final abandonment of the 
northern route, described:  
A total absence of darkness throughout the 24 hours is making 
seagoing traffic to Murmansk and Archangel extremely vulnerable to 
German naval and air attack… Moreover, reports from Stockholm 
believed trustworthy state that the Germans have recently 
concentrated a strong naval force at Narvik… Stoppage of supplies to 
the Soviet Union via the northern route would be a serious 
disadvantage to Russia at this moment.6 
 
The failure of the northern route naturally threw the spotlight on the Persian 
corridor as the only other key alternative for transporting goods to the Soviet Union.  
By September 1942, the War Department was advocating the improvement of the 
Persian Corridor shipping operations in order to increase its capacity.  In a booklet 
published that month, entitled Plan for Operation of Certain Iranian Communication 
Facilities between Persian Gulf Ports and Tehran by US Army Forces,  the War 
Department recommended that,  
                                                 
5 Coakley, 158.   I will return to this final point, regarding the establishment of a British or American 
position in Iran, later on in the chapter. 
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if the volume of shipments to Russia via the Persian Gulf is to be 
increased in time to be of material aid, immediate action will be 
necessary.  The possibility of using successfully the northern sea route 
to Russia seems remote.  The desirability of increasing the capacity of 
this route, if not the absolute necessity for doing so, seems of the first 
order of importance.7 
 
In order to further develop the southern route, the British and American militaries 
formed the Combined Military Transportation Committee (CTMC).  The CMTC 
sought to increase the capacity of the Persian Corridor by ensuring that it was 
“economically operated, and in particular that: (a) Ships are not unduly delayed; (b) 
Port and internal clearance agencies are kept working to full capacity but are not 
overloaded.”8   
While they were still concerned with the problem an American or British 
stronghold in Iran, the Soviets realized that the immediate needs to insure its 
military survival were much more critical, and therefore “reversed their previous 
position and asked that not only places and trucks but all sorts of military 
equipment in the largest quantities possible come via the southern route.”9  Once 
this material reached Iran’s northern border with the Soviet Union, however, 
instead of continuing to expedite the shipping process by allowing the United States 
to transport the material all the way to the front lines (or even, at least, partway into 
the Soviet Union), Soviet officials insisted that the material be transferred directly to 
the Red Army at the border, a policy which served to slow the shipping process (but 
                                                 
7 FDR.  President's Soviet Protocol Committee.  Box 25, Plan for Operation of Certain Iranian 
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8 FDR. President’s Soviet Protocol Committee.  Box 20, Persian Gulf: CMTC Papers. 1943. 
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which also gave the Soviet Union far more consolidated control over the Caucasus 
region). 
However, the use of Iran as a route through which to ship material to the 
Soviet Union was still an issue fraught with politics.  Some in the War Department 
believed that it was not in the United States’ best interests to put large groups of 
American ground forces in the Middle East.  In June 1942, the War Department’s 
Chief of Staff, George Marshall, wrote a letter to President Roosevelt expressing his 
opposition to the transition of power over the Persian Corridor from Great Britain to 
the United States:  
The leakage or wastage of strength logistically in operating in such 
distant theaters is tremendous… if we undertake to support large 
forces in the Middle East, it is our opinion that we have denied the 
probability of assembling American forces of decisive power in an 
theater in this war… You are familiar with my view that the decisive 
theater is Western Europe…. A large venture in the Middle East would 
make a decisive American contribution to the campaign in Western 
Europe out of the question.  Therefore, I am opposed to such a 
project.10 
 
Marshall believed that by focusing too much on shipment efforts in Iran (and, 
consequently, by focusing too much on directly supporting the USSR), the United 
States was losing its focus on what he saw as the primary target: Western Europe.   
While most others in the War Department recognized, and advocated the 
benefits of a significant American military presence in Iran, many in the State 
Department shared Marshall’s broad sentiments.  The State Department did not 
argue about the importance of one theater of war over another – rather, it saw the 
United States’ military efforts in Iran on behalf of the Soviet Union as damaging to 
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American long-term interests.  Especially in the later years of the war, the State 
Department became increasingly concerned about the Soviet Union’s global postwar 
ambitions.  It eventually became clear that both the United States and the Soviet 
Union would emerge from the war as the two primary global powers, and that the 
Soviet Union could pose a grave threat to the United States.  Among its many 
concerns regarding the potential postwar bipolar world, the State Department was 
concerned that the Soviet Union would attempt to spread its influence into Iran and 
the Middle East.  While an actual containment policy doctrine would not become 
prevalent in the United States until after the war, many in the State Department had 
already been concerned about the spread of Communism for many years.  The fact 
that the American military was shipping billions of dollars of weapons, 
ammunitions, and other supplies to this potential future enemy, then, was quite 
troubling.  And while the United States and the Soviet Union were largely 
cooperative during the war, the State Department was aware that the Soviet Union 
harbored territorial ambitions in Iran.11 
 
II. Border Politics 
 The Soviet Union’s primary interests in Iran were twofold:  First, 
much like the United States, it desired access to Iran’s rich oil reserves.  
Second, it desired either free access to, or control over, Iran’s warm water 
ports on the Persian Gulf.  In a policy essay written shortly after the war, John 
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Cooper Wiley, an American foreign service officer who served as Ambassador 
to Iran from 1947-1948, discussed the Soviet Union’s interest in Iranian 
petroleum: 
Iran, a country that almost floats on oil, had long been a prime 
objective of Russian ambitions.  On November 25, 1940, when the 
Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were virtually allies, the Soviet 
government demanded of Hitler that ‘the area South of Batum and 
Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf should be recognized 
as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union.’  This area was 
certainly intended to include, in addition to Iran, the petroleum of the 
Persian Gulf.12 
 
During the war period, the Soviet Union had access to very few warm 
water ports, and even those were on mostly landlocked bodies of water such 
as the Black Sea.  With access to Iranian ports at Khorramshahr, Bandar 
Abbas, and Bandar Shahpur, the Soviet Union would be able to increase its 
trade capacity tremendously.  As Major General Donald Connolly wrote to 
Harry Hopkins in February 1944, access to the Persian Gulf would provide 
the Soviet Union with perhaps one of its only opportunities to partake in 
global trade in any significant way:  
Russia is seeking a warm-water port.  The Baltic is closed to the 
outside world at Skagerrak.  Even if Russia controlled the Dardanelles, 
the Mediterranean is closed at Gibraltar and the Suez Canal.  The 
eastern port of Vladivostok is closed by the Japanese Islands, so that is 
the only possible place where Russia can find free access to the 
world’s oceans and trade is through the Persian Corridor and the Gulf 
Ports.13 
 
Especially after the Soviet Union joined the side of the Allies, it found its access to 
the world’s oceans not only limited by geographical constraints, but also severely 
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limited by hostile Japanese and Nazi ships.  After the joint Anglo-Soviet invasion of 
Iran in August 1941, the ability to have either access to, or control over, the warm 
water ports on the Persian Gulf became a feasible reality: “This access to the sea that 
hitherto had only been a dream now has been made a reality as a consequence of 
General Connolly and the Persian Gulf Command…”14  The wartime transportation 
efforts of the Persian Gulf Command succeeded in building and improving Iranian 
infrastructure, which would smooth the path for the Soviet Union to potentially 
develop its own, postwar, transportation efforts south through Iran to the Persian 
Gulf. 
 The United States, however, was clearly wary about the idea of a Communist 
Russia with free access to the Persian Gulf.  While the importance of the Soviet 
Union’s military victory over Nazi Germany was appreciated by nearly everyone in 
the United States government, it was important to American policymakers that the 
power of the postwar Soviet Union be checked.   Administrators in the State 
Department were well aware that after the war, the United States and the Soviet 
Union would be competing for the same resources and the same economic benefits 
in Iran.   
As the war drew to a close, fears of increasing Soviet interference in Iran 
began to rise.  In a January 1945 memorandum to the president, Acting Secretary of 
State Joseph Grew wrote that “Many Soviet officials undoubtedly believe that Russia 
must have an assured outlet to the Persian Gulf, to be obtained by forceful means if 
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necessary.”15  For a short while, a number of ideas where developed to preclude 
such an action on the part of the Soviet Union.  One such idea was to allow the Soviet 
Union access to the Persian Gulf ports, so long as this access would be shared by the 
international community.  Joseph Grew suggested to Roosevelt that the United 
States work to develop an international trusteeship over the Trans-Iranian Railway, 
along with a free port  on the Persian Gulf.  This action  
might render less likely a more exigent demand by Russia.  The 
trusteeship would assure to Russia an uhampered trade outlet to the 
Persian Gulf and would at the same time assist Iran economically by 
developing an important transit trade through the country and by 
improving Iranian transport facilities for its internal trade… the 
trusteeship proposal would be in the direction of British-Soviet-
American cooperation rather than rivalry in Iran.16 
 
While Grew argued that the international trusteeship would support Iran’s 
domestic economy, the idea was nevertheless ill-received by Iranian officials.  
The trusteeship was seen as an infringement upon Iranian sovereignty, and 
American officials discovered that “no matter how drawn up or proposed, the 
plan would appear to Iran… as a thinly disguised cover for power politics and 
old-world imperialism.”17  In the end, the idea was not implemented, and the 
United States had to content itself with simply keeping a close watch on the 
Soviet Union and Iran. 
 While the Soviet Union did not end up launching a full-scale invasion of 
Iran in order to claim its ports, there were many moments of friction at the 
Soviet-Iranian border.  As was mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union espoused 
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highly territorial policies, and did not allow American troops to cross the border 
into the Soviet Union.  Although its military was suffering tremendously from the 
German onslaught, Joseph Stalin nevertheless did not fully trust the United States 
or Great Britain.  The Soviet Union’s desire to maintain control over its borders 
in many ways remained paramount, even though it was already under attack in 
the west.  This territoriality was perhaps due to the fact that the Soviet Union 
wished to keep strict control over its southernmost territory, in order to leave it 
in a position to exercise greater control over Iran after the end of the war.  This 
idea is supported in an August 1944 memorandum sent to Harry Hopkins on 
American Policy in the Middle East: “Russia’s eyes in Persia are definitely on the 
Persian Gulf… Russian policy presently deems it best to keep the Persian 
Government weak.  Russian occupation in the North is complete and exclusive.”18 
 Concerns over Soviet intentions in Iran were later heightened when, 
towards the very end of the war, “Soviet-sponsored separatists in Azerbaijan and 
Kurdistan, under the political mantel of the Democratic Part of Azerbaijan, began 
seizing control... it was clear that the Soviets had both exacerbated and manipulated 
these tensions to create a puppet regime in the area under their control.”19  This 
Azerbaijan, a separate entity from the Republic of Azerbaijan, was a region in 
northern Iran, and Kurdistan was a province in northwest Iran.  When the Iranian 
government tried to send its military forces and government officials to the region 
to investigate, the Red Army barred those officials from entering into the region:  
                                                 
18 FDR.  Hopkins, Harry L.  Box 332, Book 8 - Interest in Middle East. 
19 Palmer, 30. 
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My Government’s efforts to send reinforcements to the local 
garrisons[…] were, and are still, frustrated by the refusal of the Red 
Army at Kazvin to allow a detachment of Persian troops to advance 
north into the affected areas…  the Soviet Government does not 
approve of our troops entering the affected zone because this might 
lead to clashes and bloodshed, and in that case, the Soviets will be 
obliged to bring more troops into Iran.20 
 
It is important to note that  the Soviet Union was threatening to send even more 
troops into Iran, should the Iranian military enter its own territory in Azerbaijan.  
By issuing this warning, the Soviet government was, in effect, consolidating its 
power and control over that region.  Because it was not fully checked, the Soviet 
Union continued to interfere with the local operations of Iranian forces through the 
end of the war.  In a letter to the Secretary of State at the very end of the war, in May 
1945, Leland Morris, the new American Ambassador in Iran, expressed frustration 
over the Soviet obstructions to the operations of the Iranian Gendarmerie: “Russian 
interference with the activities of Iranian security forces is, in effect, a negation of 
Iranian sovereignty over a substantial part of the country and violates the spirit, at 
least, of the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1942.”21  The Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty, 
among other things, committed Iran to supplying nonmilitary aid to the Allied war 
effort, and committed the Allies to removing their troops from Iran no later than six 
months after the end of the war.  In effect, the treaty, while demanding that Iran play 
its role in furthering the Allied war effort, also recognized the autonomy of the 
Iranian government.  The fact that the Soviet Union was overstepping its bounds – 
                                                 
20 NARA.  Record Group 59, Central Decimal Files; 1945-1949, File #701.9111; Iranian Diplomatic 
Representation in the United States.  Letter from the Iranian Ambassador to President Truman. 
21 FRUS, 1945.  The Near East and Africa, Volume III: 528-529. 
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as outlined in the treaty – was worrisome to many policymakers in the United 
States. 
In an article from the New York Times, journalist W.H. Lawrence reported 
that American officials “had long feared trouble in that part of Iran because of the 
Soviet Union’s desire for important oil concessions and the Iranian Government’s 
persistent refusal to grant them.”22  This blatant disregard for Iranian autonomy 
further fueled American fears that the Soviet Union might soon forcefully pursue 
further territorial objectives in Iran.  This would, of course, endanger American 
foreign policy objectives in Iran.  These specific concerns, paired with growing 
general sentiment within the United States that Communism was an expansive, 
global threat that needed to be constrained, helped to create American foreign 
policies towards Iran that were couched in the concerns and language of what 
would become the containment policy. 
 
III. Looking Forward Towards a Containment Policy 
While the Cold War and the containment policy are usually associated 
with postwar politics, the United States was in fact actively concerned with 
checking Soviet power as early as 1944.  Anti-Communist sentiment, however, 
was even prevalent among American policymakers from a much earlier date.  
When the United States first began to supply aid to the Soviet Union, it 
recognized that it was providing aid to a past – and potentially future – enemy.  
However, quelling the Nazi threat was a far more pressing need.  A November 
                                                 
22 NARA.  Record Group 59, Central Decimal Files; 1945-1949, File #701.9111; Iranian Diplomatic 
Representation in the United States.  Letter from the Iranian Ambassador to President Truman. 
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1941 article from the Associate Press describes how W. Averell Harriman, the 
chairman of Roosevelt’s mission to Soviet Russia, assured the American Legion 
that American aid to Russia “in no way compromises our opposition to 
Communism.  Our aid… is being given to the Russian solider, to the Russian people, 
because they are fighting Hitler’s war machine in the defense of their homes and 
their land.”23 
As the war began to reach its end, however, American policymakers began to 
look ahead to the postwar world.  It was clear that both the United States and the 
Soviet Union would emerge from the war as global powers, and that they might 
come to blows in a number of key regions around the world.  Because of the growing 
importance of its petroleum resources, Iran was one such region of concern.  In a 
November 1944 article in the Washington News, William Philip Simms discussed 
the concern in Iran about Soviet postwar intentions, and about the fear that the 
Soviet Union would not adhere to the Atlantic Charter: “The 27th anniversary of the 
Bolshevist revolution find officials here torn between unstinted admiration for the 
Red army and growing concern over Russia’s future, but still far from clear, 
intentions… What is not clear today, however, is whether Iran is to become another 
Poland.”24  The comparison to Poland is quite potent – the fear was not simply that 
the Soviet Union would exercise its influence over Iran to achieve oil concessions, 
but that it would initiate a physical hostile takeover of Iran. 
                                                 
23 FDR. President's Soviet Protocol Committee.  Box 25, Newspaper Clippings and Other Data File. 
24 FDR. Republican National Committee Papers.  Box 46, Teheran; Cairo; Iran – Newspaper clippings 
(Folder 11-12). 
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Therefore, “in light of Britain’s depleted economic and military resources and 
the strengthened Soviet position in Iran during the war, the American State 
Department would actively explore possible means of containing Soviet influence in 
Iran even before the war came to a close.”25  As the Cold War temperament began 
to gain ascendancy in the State Department, it began to compete with the War 
Department’s policy of continuing to bolster the Easter Front and of completing 
its Soviet Protocol obligations.  The United States’ military presence in Iran was 
dictated primarily by the need to provide the Soviet Union with military aid; at 
the same time, many of the State Department’s concerns over Iran were shaped 
by the threat posed by the Soviet Union to Iran.  If the USSR were to exert 
successfully its influence in the region, then the United States’ own foreign policy 
ambitions in Iran – as discussed in the previous chapter – would be threatened.  
The conflict created by these two policies within the United States government 
did not ultimately halt U.S. aid to the Soviet Union.  It did, however, cultivate an 
environment of veiled hostility and mistrust towards Soviet Russia, as well as a 
sort of cognitive dissonance in policymaking – at the same time as the United 
States continued to provide aid to the USSR through the Persian Corridor, it 
would look ahead and create plans to obstruct the Soviet Union’s own territorial 
ambitions in Iran.
                                                 
25 Bonakdarian, 23. 
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III. Tensions on the Ground: Military 
and Diplomatic Institutions in Iran 
 
 
 In the previous two chapters, I discussed U.S. policy towards Iran on a 
grand scale – its development and implementation, the tensions between 
diplomatic and military policy, and the geopolitical foundations, causes, and 
consequences of those policies.  These tensions cut to the heart of the United 
States’ relationship – and projected relationship – with Iran.  Would the United 
States pursue policies that encouraged friendly relations with Iran, thereby creating 
the possibility to develop its postwar trade relations with the country, and 
strengthen its foothold in the region?  Or would the United States give priority to the 
all-important war effort, which would require encroaching upon Iranian 
sovereignty, angering the Iranian government, and potentially threaten the future of 
American-Iranian relations?  As we have seen, there was no single answer to these 
questions.  Both the State and War departments pursued their agendas 
simultaneously, which led to the implementation of policies that conflicted with one 
another, and that would sometimes damage the effectiveness of the department’s 
objectives.  In this chapter, I will look at how those greater policy tensions within 
the United States government promoted conflict among U.S. military and 
diplomatic institutions, officers, and personnel on the ground in Iran. 
 
I. The Persian Gulf Service Command 
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 The Persian Gulf Service Command began in 1941 as a small military mission 
(called the U.S. Military Iranian Mission) led by Colonel Raymond Wheeler, which 
assisted British troops in facilitating the shipment of Lend-Lease supplies to the 
Soviet Union.  In April 1942, after being renamed the Iran-Iraq Service Command,  
the mission began to report to the Cairo headquarters of the US Army Forces in the 
Middle East, and Colonel Don G. Shingler replaced Wheeler as its commander.  In 
August 1942, the mission was placed under the direction of Major General Donald 
Connolly and renamed once again, becoming known as the Persian Gulf Service 
Command.  In a booklet entitled Plan for Operation of Certain Iranian 
Communication Facilities between Persian Gulf Ports and Tehran by US Army Forces, 
published in September of 1942, the mission’s responsibilities and goals are 
outlined: “You will be permitted wide latitude, subject to the supervision of the 
Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Middle East.  It is to be 
borne in mind that your mission is to insure the uninterrupted flow of an expanding 
volume of supplies to Russia.”1  Finally, in December 1943, the PGSC’s efforts in the 
Persian Corridor had become significant enough that the mission began to report 
directly to the War Department in Washington.  By the war’s end, the PGSC would 
consist of nearly 30,000 noncombatant troops, and had overseen the transportation 
of nearly $18 billion in goods to the Soviet Union.2 
 Even at the time, it was debatable whether or not the presence of 
American troops in Iran was helpful or detrimental to American prestige (and 
                                                 
1 FDR. President's Soviet Protocol Committee.  Box 25, Plan for Operation of Certain Iranian 
Communication Facilities between Persian Gulf Ports and Tehran by US Army Forces. 3 Sept. 1942. 
2 Pollack, 40. 
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therefore to the mission of the United States’ diplomatic presence in Iran).  In a 
memorandum sent to Harry Hopkins on February 26th, 1944, Connolly shared his 
personal opinion that  
It is recognized that the technical training obtained by Iranians 
working with and for American troops has been one of the greatest 
opportunities yet offered to Iranians.  This is particularly true in the 
railroad setup, where the employees of the railroad, under the 
direction of American troops, are acquiring technical knowledge 
which they could otherwise not acquire in Iran.  Moreover, the 
American Army in all its relationships with Iranians has showed the 
American spirit of fair play.  The pay of Iranian personnel has been 
made regularly and has been granted on the basis of service rendered.  
This spirit of fair play in the ordinary business relationships is much 
appreciated by the Iranians.3 
 
Connolly claimed that the United States’ military presence was having a 
beneficial impact on grassroots American-Iranian relations, mostly because the 
American military was a good employer.  In a country that had many economic 
difficulties even before the outbreak of hostilities, steady and well-paid work 
would have been welcome by its citizens.  In this sense, according to Connolly, 
the United States was engaging in a sort of “citizen” diplomacy in Iran through its 
military.   
 At the same time, however, many argue the opposite.  While the PGSC did 
hire a great number of Iranians to support the Persian Corridor supply routes, it 
was at the same time monopolizing Iran’s roads and railroads,  creating an 
impediment to domestic trade and the transportation of food and supplies.  An 
editorial in Iranian newspaper The Iran complained that the war “has closed all 
the roads to Iran and Iran is by no means responsible for it.  This has created 
                                                 
3 FDR.  Hopkins, Harry L.  Box 332, Book 8 - Interest in Middle East. 
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difficulties of all kind for us especially in the matter of food supply.  Iran needs 
wheat.  Iran needs means of transport.  Iran needs sugar.  Iran needs articles which 
she was previously importing from abroad.”4  This problem became particularly 
onerous during the 1942 famine.  During that year, the shortage of food became 
so grave that many Iranians began to incite bread riots: “By the end of [1942], the 
US embassy in Tehran was reporting that the government could only keep two days’ 
worth of wheat… on hand…  This state of affairs led to violent bread riots in 1942.”5  
Even worse, many Iranians were resentful that the monopolization of domestic 
transportation was being used to support the Soviets.  Relations between Iran and 
the Soviet Union were bitter, and it was therefore frustrating for Iranians to know 
that they were suffering shortages so that the Soviets could continue to be well-
supplied.  An August 1942 informal aide memoire from Allah Yar Saleh, Chief of the 
Iranian Trade and Economic Mission to the US, to Sumner Welles communication 
the frustration of the Iranian people: “It is impossible to explain to Iranians how no 
shipping can be provided for some of the immediate needs of Iran while the people 
of Iran constantly observe that American material is being unloaded in the Persian 
Gulf and carried through Iran to Russia.”6   
This bitterness continued well after the bread riots subsided.  Iranians were 
well aware that to the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, their country was 
militarily nothing more than a byway.  While the United States did have diplomatic 
interests in Iran, its military was, for the most part, unconcerned with the well-being 
                                                 
4 NARA. American Embassy, Tehran, Iran 1942.  Record Group 84, MLR UD Entry 2737, Box 45.  
Excerpt from editorial in newspaper “The Iran”, dated September 15, 1942, on Willkie’s visit to Iran. 
5 Pollack, 43. 
6 FDR. Welles, Sumner.  Box 165, Iran.  1938 – 1942. 
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of Iranian citizens.  Mohammad Shayesteh, the Iranian Minister to the United States, 
further illustrated Iranian’s frustrations in a speech at the Annual Dinner of the 
Iranian Institute on December 16, 1943:  
How often have we not read about the so-called ‘Lifeline to Russia’ 
described in such a manner as to give the reader the impression that 
our railroads, our highways, and even our ports did not exist before 
the war and had all been built during the past two years… Iran is in 
most serious economic difficulties right now and… these difficulties 
are entirely caused by the war… Our contribution [to the war effort] 
has not been without hardship and sacrifices.  The scarcity of food 
reaching famine proportions, the epidemics of typhus and other 
diseases… will cause 1942 and 1943 to be remembered for many long 
years with grief and sorrow.7 
 
This frustration and bitterness, while mostly inconsequential to the War 
Department, often created havoc for the American diplomatic mission in 
Iran.  If Iranians were upset about the American military presence in their 
country, their feelings would certainly not stop the flow of supplies from 
the Gulf ports to the northern border with the Soviet Union.  Iranian 
feelings, however, could have dire consequences on the United States’ 
ability to improve its diplomatic standing with that country after the war, 
and could seriously impede efforts to improve trade relations and obtain 
oil concessions.  Luckily, for most of the war, the State Department had 
installed a very talented diplomat at its legation in Tehran. 
 
II. The American Legation in Iran and the Preservation of Prestige  
                                                 
7 NARA. RG 59, File #701.9111, 1940-1945.  Text of speech by Mr. Mohammad Shayesteh at the 
Annual Dinner of the Iranian Institute, December 16, 1943.  Entitled “Iran in the International Scene”. 
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Well before the United States became embroiled in the war, it maintained 
a small legation in Tehran.8  The legation’s role there was primarily to maintain 
cordial relations with Iran in order to look after the interests of American 
merchants, missionaries, and pilgrims who traveled there.  Historian James Bill 
describes the chief diplomatic officer of the legation, Minister Louis Dreyfus, Jr., 
as a “shy, sensitive individual and perhaps one of the best minister/ambassadors 
that the United States ever sent to Iran.  He was extremely popular among Iranians 
of all classes, who respected his sincere commitment to understanding and 
communicating their concerns to his government in Washington.”9  Even before 
Dreyfus was assigned to the legation, it was recognized that he was a talented 
diplomat and would be well-suited to serve in Iran.  In a memo dated June 23, 1939, 
Brigadier General E.M. Watson wrote to Roosevelt that had “talked personally with 
Mr. [Cordell] Hull and he said that Iran was a very delicate place and they had just 
established satisfactory, cordial relations there, and he thought this man Dreyfus 
was particularly qualified to carry that on.”10  The fact that Hull was highly confident 
in Dreyfus’ ability to succeed in a country with whom the United States did not yet 
have robust, solid relations was a strong indicator of his talents as a diplomat and of 
his ability to continue to strengthen American relations with Iran.  To that extent, 
the legation was quite successful – Dreyfus had a long history of good rapport 
with the Iranian government, and was popular with the Iranian public at large (a 
September 1942 article from Persian newspaper The Iran even described Dreyfus as 
                                                 
8 A legation was a diplomatic representative office, ranking below an embassy.  The office was 
upgraded to an embassy in August 1944. 
9 Bill, 21. 
10 FDR. Papers as President, Official File.  Dreyfus, Louis G., Jr. 1933-1945.  File 3697. 
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“loveable”).11  This assertion about Dreyfus’ popularity is substantiated by a number 
of sources from the Iranian side, including a request by Iranian officials in March 
1944 that the State Department not remove Dreyfus from his post.  At the time, the 
State Department was planning to relocate Dreyfus to Iceland and replace him with 
a diplomat named Leland Morris, primarily because of internal politics.  When the 
Iranian government learned of the planned move, however, it protested.  A 
memorandum from the Secretary of State, dated March 14, 1944, described the 
situation:  
the minister of Iran transmits a request from the Iranian Government 
for reconsideration of the recall of Dreyfus.  The Iran Government 
expressed hope that Mr. Dreyfus will be appointed Ambassador to 
Iran.  The Iran Government has nothing against Leland Morris and will 
be glad to agree to Mr. Morris’ appointment but feel that Mr. Dreyfus 
would be better as he knows and understands them.12 
 
Further information about Iran’s attachment to Dreyfus can be found in a 
memorandum dated a few days earlier, on March 9th, by diplomat Adolf Berle, Jr.  
Recounting a conversation with Iran’s minister in Washington, Mohammad 
Shayesteh, Berle writes that while Shayesteh did not have any complaints against 
Leland Morris, he claimed that Dreyfus “had upheld the interests of Iran and of the 
United States at a time when the Middle East supply center was falling down badly 
on supplies, and so forth.”13  As will be illustrated later in the chapter, Dreyfus was 
aware – especially during the war – that it was in the United States’ best interests to 
support positive relations with Iran, and that enhancing American prestige in Iran 
                                                 
11 NARA.  American Embassy, Tehran, Iran 1942.  Record Group 84, MLR UD Entry 2737, Box 45.  
Excerpt from editorial in newspaper “The Iran”, dated September 15, 1942, on Willkie’s visit to Iran. 
12 FDR. Roosevelt, Franklin D. Papers as President, Official File (OF).  Box 0/134.   Iran (Persia), 
Government of - Endorsements for Ambassador.  OF 134: Iran. 
13 FDR. Roosevelt, Franklin D. Papers as President, President's Secretary's File.  Box 40, Iran 
Diplomatic Correspondence. 
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would later be crucial for developing trade relations and securing oil concessions 
from Iran.  It is no wonder that he was so popular with the Iranian government and 
people – Louis Dreyfus was culturally sensitive, a talented diplomat, and fully 
dedicated to maintaining positive relations between the United States and Iran.   
 However hard Dreyfus worked to uphold American prestige, the necessity 
for an American military presence in Iran during the war often proved damaging to 
Iranian popular perceptions of the United States and Americans.  Even early on in 
the war, many Americans faced some hostility from the Iranian government and the 
Iranian people, as a result of U.S. impingement on Iranian sovereignty.  In particular, 
towards the beginning of the war, Iranians were sometimes hostile to Americans 
because they believed they were collaborating with the British (this perception was 
most likely encouraged by the presence of the U.S. Military Mission to Iran, which 
assisted British troops in Iran even before the United States formally entered the 
war).  In a letter dated September 4, 1941, American and British journalists, 
attempting to cover the joint British-Russian invasion of Iran, complained that they 
were “meeting with considerable difficulty in despatching [sic] their messages 
through the Iranian telegraph and wireless office… We have numerous instances of 
the childishly obvious methods adopted by the high officials in the Iranian telegraph 
and wireless to hold back our messages.” 
 As was discussed in chapter one, the United States believed that its 
reputation suffered damage because many Middle Eastern countries associated its 
policies with that of Great Britain.  The United States therefore attempted to 
separate itself from Great Britain in the eyes of those countries, so that it would be 
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looked upon more favorably in the international scene.  It appears that early on in 
the war, the presence of American troops in Iran under the auspices of the British 
Command proved to be a source of friction between Iran and the United States.  In a 
December 1943 report outlining the formation of a general American policy 
towards Iran, Brigadier General Patrick Hurley wrote to Roosevelt that 
Many Iranian officials believe that American troops are in Iran on the 
invitation and for the purpose of serving as an instrumentality of 
Britain.  For a year or more we have had under negotiation with Iran a 
treaty wherein Iran would recognize the presence of American troops 
as an American operation.  The ineffective presentation of the treaty 
has not been helpful to American prestige with the Iranians… since 
our troops entered Iran on the invitation of the British, without 
advance notice to the Government of Iran, it was natural for the 
Iranians to look upon us as a British instrumentality.14 
 
Great Britain – not the United States – had invaded Iran and ousted its ruler.  
Because of that fact, and a number of other reasons besides, Iranian relations 
with Great Britain were particularly sour.  The fact that the United States would 
be lending its troops to assist Great Britain’s efforts in Iran was doing more 
damage to American prestige there than if the United States were to simply take 
over the entire shipping operation and claim it as its own.  Then, at least, while 
the presence of American troops in Iran would still cause some friction between 
the two countries, Iran would at least be less upset than if the United States was 
blatantly collaborating with the British. 
 However, encouraging Iran to recognize the presence of the Persian Gulf 
Service Command as an American – and not British – operation would not fully 
protect American prestige.  Throughout its tenure in Iran, the PGSC came under 
                                                 
14 FDR. Roosevelt, Franklin D. Papers as President, President's Secretary's File.  Box 40, Iran 
Diplomatic Correspondence. 
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occasional scrutiny for the poor behavior of its troops, and for the damage its 
troops was making on US-Iranian relations.  In a letter to the Secretary of State, 
Louis Dreyfus complained that the PGSC was “not an army at all.  It is a potpourri 
of civilians in uniform, hastily assembled to do a special job in Iran.  As a unit it is 
sadly lacking in cohesion, morale, military discipline, training and knowledge of 
military tradition.”  He strongly believed that the American position in Iran could 
be “adversely affected by poor conduct on the part of our forces,” and therefore 
worried that the short-sightedness of the military mission (in focusing purely 
upon its military goals) could cause serious damage to American prestige in Iran, 
and to the United State’s long-term diplomatic goals in the region.15 
 
III. Tensions Between the War and State Departments 
Over the course of the war, the United States maintained multiple 
missions in Iran.  These included the Persian Gulf Service Command, a consulting 
mission to the Iranian Army led by General Clarence Ridley, and a consulting 
mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie led by Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf, all 
under the War Department.  Additionally, the State Department maintained a 
legation in Tehran, and sent a financial advisory mission to the Iranian 
government led by Arthur Millspaugh.  Commenting on the sudden growth in 
American involvement in Iran during the war, James Bill notes that “the internal 
conflict that marked the American missions in Iran had an important impact on 
policy.  Since each mission had slightly different goals, the leaders of each sought to 
                                                 
15 FRUS, 1943.  The Near East and Africa, Volume IV: 500. 
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emphasize their goals over those of other U.S. organizations.”16  For example, the 
primary goal of Major General Donald Connolly, the head of the Persian Gulf Service 
Command, was the successful shipment of American Lend-Lease aid to Soviet Russia 
through the Persian Corridor.  Connolly was representative of the entire War 
Department, whose attitude was that long-term American diplomatic interests took 
a backseat to the short-term military aims of the war.  In a May 1942 
memorandum, W.M. Adams, the chief of the Military Attaché Section, ordered 
that all military attachés “inform this office in detail of any non-military duties 
performed by Military Attachés… It is requested that this letter be shown to the 
Chief of Mission, as the War Department objects strongly to the use of Military 
representatives abroad in any capacity other than a Military one under present 
conditions.”17  The War Department was clearly concerned that its personnel should 
focus only upon the Department’s military aims, and that the State Department not 
take advantage of these men to further the development or implementation of any 
other American policies.  Dreyfus – and the State Department – on the other hand, 
believed that not only were long-term diplomatic policies important even in 
wartime, but that the War Department should take care to implement policies that 
would not damage American prestige or frustrate its diplomatic goals.  
Unfortunately, in Iran these tensions were augmented due to a general lack of 
coordination and poor communication among the various missions as they 
pursued their individual goals in the region. 
                                                 
16 Bill, 45-46. 
17 NARA.  American Embassy, Tehran, Iran 1942.  Record Group 84, MLR UD Entry 2737, Box 45.  
Memorandum for all Military Attachés from W.M. Adams May 17, 1942.   
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 These coordination problems were not unique to Iran – in fact, it is likely 
that the poor communication among American institutions in Iran was amplified 
by similar communication problems in Cairo, the headquarters of U.S. Army 
Forces in the Middle East and the epicenter of the Allies’ supply efforts in the 
region.  In February 1942, director of the State Department’s Division of Near 
Eastern Affairs Wallace Murray complained that the American legation in Cairo 
had begun to work closely with the Middle East Supply Center to deal with 
supply problems.  He claimed that 
this Division [Department of State Division of Near Eastern Affairs] is 
of course primarily concerned with political matters and we do not 
consider ourselves competent, nor do we have the time, to assume 
primary responsibility for all of the work involved in the Near East 
supply problem, which, though it has important political aspects, 
nevertheless appears to be predominantly economic in character.18 
 
It is seems here that the different American governmental institutions in the 
Middle East were faced with the proverbial predicament in which the left hand 
does not know what the right hand is doing.  Coordination and communication 
among different Departments in Cairo had become such a problem that the 
legation felt it was interceding in an operation which was not directly linked with 
its own mission. 
 In Iran, this lack of coordination often translated into antagonism between 
the different departments.  One of the reasons this occurred was because the 
policy tensions were often aggravated by personal rivalries, particularly among 
the important personalities leading the various American missions.  James Bill, 
                                                 
18 NARA. Record Group 59, Central Decimal Files; 1940-1944, File #111.23; Department of State 
Division of Near Eastern Affairs.  From Wallace Murray to “Dr Feis”, dated February 25, 1942.   
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applying a universal truism that a country can only demonstrate strength if it 
presents a united front to its allies and rivals, claims that “the immediate 
introduction of intense rivalry among Americans in Iran weakened the authority 
and credibility of US policy.”19  The most clear example of this is the case where the 
three major military missions to Iran – those led by Connolly, Ridley, and General 
John Greely (Ridley’s predecessor) – encouraged Dreyfus’ removal from his post.  As 
James Bill describes it, “both Gen. John Greely and Gen. Clarence Ridley clashed with 
Minister Dreyfus over the question of authority and responsibility… [Ridley] wanted 
military issues to take precedence over political considerations and sought to 
strengthen the place and role of the Iranian military while ignoring the political 
context.”20  The result of Dreyfus’ removal was the general weakening of America’s 
diplomatic clout in Iran – none of his predecessors were nearly as popular or as 
successful with the Iranians as Dreyfus had been (four more Ambassadors served in 
Iran over the next six years, and none managed to achieve Dreyfus’ level of 
popularity).   
 
IV. The Connolly-Dreyfus Rivalry  
While rivalries among American leaders in Iran seemed to be common 
across the board, none was as potent or manifested itself as often as the rivalry 
between Minister Louis Dreyfus and Major General Donald Connolly.  Each of 
these two men took his work and his mission very seriously, and believed that 
his work had to be considered top-priority.  These beliefs were supported 
                                                 
19 Bill, 23. 
20 Bill, 22. 
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respectively by the State and War Departments, and often resulted in barely-
veiled hostility between the two officials.   
There is a series of letters that date back to the summer of 1943, 
documented in Foreign Relations of the United States, that present this dynamic 
between Connolly and Dreyfus.  The thoughts and subtleties expressed in those 
letters demonstrate not only the extent of the Connolly-Dreyfus rivalry, but also 
illuminate many subtleties in the greater policy conflicts that the rivalry 
represented. 
In a letter addressed to the United States Secretary of State in late June 
1943, Dreyfus criticized the conduct of the American forces of the Persian Gulf 
Service Command that were stationed there, as well as the ineffective leadership 
of the PGSC in controlling its rowdy troops.  Dreyfus specifically mentioned that 
he had directed these criticisms to PGSC General Donald Connolly, and expressed 
the hope that General Connolly would work to address the situation.  Enclosed 
with this letter was another letter by Dreyfus, this time addressed directly to 
General Connolly.  This letter addressed the complaints that the Iranian Foreign 
Office had been levying against the legation, and painstakingly outlined the state 
of American-Iranian relations, and the necessity of maintaining the United States’ 
good reputation among Iranian citizens.  The letter closed with the wish that the 
General would “take the matter into [his] own hands.”21 
 What exactly was the nature of American soldiers’ inappropriate conduct?  
The answer lies only a few letters earlier, where Dreyfus, in a letter addressed to 
                                                 
21 FRUS, 1943. The Near East and Africa: Volume IV, 499-503. 
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the Secretary of State, outlined thirteen different incidents, including fatal 
accidents by American drivers, one hit-and-run incident, a few incidents of 
molestation of women, property damage, and public drunkenness.  This was a 
particularly contentious problem, given the fact that “throughout the war, the 
American troops in Iran enjoyed de facto extraterritorial rights and were 
immune from prosecution under Iranian law.”22  Iranian leaders saw this status 
as a serious infringement of Iran’s sovereignty, and incidents such as these 
simply added fuel to the fire of Iranian resentment against the United States. 
 There is much that can be learned from the language of the letter itself.  
One passage in the letter to the State Department which stands out most strongly 
is Dreyfus’ criticism of the PGSC’s “ineffective leadership”  which, he claimed, was 
“concerned almost entirely with the overriding problem of getting supplies to 
Russia.”  Dreyfus made mention of an anonymous “high ranking” officer who, 
shocked at the poor discipline of the PGSC, laid “blame squarely on the shoulders 
of the general staff.”  23  Considering the enclosed letter, which assumes complete 
ignorance of US-Iranian diplomatic relations on General Connolly’s part, as well 
as Dreyfus’ request that “drastic measures be taken” should there be no 
improvement, it is entirely possible that Dreyfus was hinting that General 
Connolly was that “ineffective leader.”  The two men had very different, and 
occasionally conflicting, objectives: Dreyfus recognized the importance of 
maintaining long-term, strong diplomatic ties with Iran, while Connolly wanted 
to ensure the timely and speedy delivery of war materiel to the Soviet Union at 
                                                 
22 Bill, 47. 
23 FRUS, 1943.  The Near East and Africa: Volume IV, 500. 
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all costs.  As statesman Dean Acheson would later document, “[Connolly’s] low 
regard for civilians caused him to treat Dreyfus disdainfully.  In turn, Connolly’s 
arrogance embittered Dreyfus and led to a feud between the Legation and PGSC 
that made the State Department’s role more difficult.”24  These letters document 
this very dynamic: with a veiled sense of antagonism towards the general, 
Dreyfus was appealing to the State Department to serve as mediator and 
overseer. 
 A separate, yet equally interesting, dynamic is presented in the enclosed 
letter from Dreyfus to General Connolly.  In the nearly two and-a-half page letter, 
Dreyfus outlined the importance of American interests in Iran, as he saw it.  
American interests, he believed, were not only in the strategic geographic 
location of Iran, but were also “based on a deep-seated and traditional American 
desire to help less fortunate nations,” as well as to use Iran as a testing ground 
for the Atlantic Charter.  25   Yet, despite the fact that Dreyfus clearly held Iranian 
welfare in high regard, he also claimed that “Iranian good will is the very 
keystone of American endeavor in Iran.”26  While the first half of the letter 
explained the importance of the American mission in helping the Iranians during 
their time of need, the second half of the letter outlined not why the servicemen’s 
ill conduct has harmed the Iranian people, but how their behavior has begun to 
jeopardize Iranian good-will towards Americans.  The United States had begun 
the decade with a positive reputation in Iranian society, and it was beginning to 
                                                 
24 State Department, 891.00/1-2844, memorandum by Dean Acheson.  Quoted in Bill, page 22. 
25 FRUS, 1943.  The Near East and Africa: Volume IV, 501. 
26 Ibid, 502. 
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look as though that reputation was about to drastically decline.  As the head of 
the legation, Dreyfus could not afford to let that happen.   
Dreyfus’ well-intentioned claims cannot be taken quite at face value – the 
American mission in Iran was not quite as altruistic as he claimed.  At the time, 
United States policy recognized the importance of good relations to long-term US 
interests.  In an early 1943 memorandum, Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
admitted that “it is to our interest that no great power be established on the 
Persian Gulf opposite the important American petroleum development in Saudi 
Arabia.”27  The ability to maintain this sort of a monopoly would, of course, be 
dependent upon strong, positive relations between the United States and oil -rich 
Middle Eastern nations.  Additionally, at this point in the war, American officials 
were beginning to not only see the benefit of maintaining strong relations with 
Iran in order to secure new oil concessions for American oil companies, but also 
the necessity of maintaining a strong and favorable presence in the region in 
order to curb Soviet influence once the war had reached a conclusion.  Whereas 
Iranian opinion of American soldiers was not particularly crucial to the PGSC 
mission, Dreyfus saw the American reputation as absolutely crucial to his 
diplomatic mission.   
Dreyfus therefore made use of frank, strong language to impress upon 
Connolly the importance of controlling his soldiers’ behavior.  Dreyfus skillfully 
claimed the political high-ground by claiming that Connolly would cooperate 
“once the American position is made clear to you” – as though until the receipt of 
                                                 
27 “Memo randum by John D. Jernegan of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs: American Policy in 
Iran,” Washington, D.C., January 23, 1943.  Printed in Bill, p.19.  
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the letter, the position had not been clear to the General at all.  By doing so, 
Dreyfus twisted the situation: it was as though General Connolly were only privy 
to part of the American objectives in Iran (namely, military-strategic), and 
Dreyfus was deigning to inform him of another, and potentially greater, objective 
in the region. 
While this series of letters is certainly fascinating in its own right, it is the 
friction that they highlight that is particularly illuminating.  The rivalry between 
Dreyfus and Connolly was a small part of the larger issue: the tensions that existed 
among policymakers in Washington as a result of the conflicting demands of the war 
effort and long-term political considerations.  As has just been illustrated, these 
tensions often caused a great deal of contradiction and discord among the policies 
themselves.  The Persian Gulf Service Command was engaged in the crucial task of 
supplying aid to Soviet Russia, and yet their presence was jeopardizing American-
Iranian relations.  
 
V. Diplomacy in the War Department 
Throughout this chapter, I have described how the War Department 
primarily focused on its goals of winning the war quickly and efficiently at minimal 
human and financial cost, while making any diplomatic considerations secondary in 
importance.  This may create the impression that the War Department pursued its 
military aims to the complete exclusion of the United States’ diplomatic goals 
abroad.  This assertion, however, would be unfair and inaccurate.  Although it was 
certainly not considered to be of primary importance, the War Department did 
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recognize the importance of ensuring that the United States was in a strong position 
to become a global power after the cessation of hostilities, and did pursue certain 
practices to conform with that goal.  This was achieved in a number of ways: First, 
the broad military strategies of the War Department were overseen and guided by 
the military’s commander-in-chief – the President of the United States (who, of 
course, also had the long-term diplomatic interests of the United States in mind 
when shaping military strategy).  Additionally, the War Department engaged in 
some minimal cultural training for many of its soldiers traveling abroad, usually in 
the form of training pamphlets. 
In 1943, the United States War Department issued a pamphlet for soldiers 
serving in Iraq during WWII that illustrated the attitudes that the military 
expected its soldiers to have going into the service.  It served as a basic guide t o 
the Iraqi climate, the people, Arabic, and Islam.  It also provided an important list 
of “dos and don’ts” for the American solider, such as not to offer alcohol to 
Muslims, to not remove a Muslim woman’s veil, and to not refuse food or drink 
when it was offered to them.   While not specifically about Iran, this guide was 
representative of the general overarching policy of the military to the Middle 
East, especially in its emphasis on the importance of getting along with the local 
population.  It was not surprising that the United States needed to drill into its 
soldiers the importance of conducting themselves with diplomacy while on their 
tour of duty.  This was a mass-conscript army, and many of these men had never 
left their home states, let alone traveled to countries abroad.  The pamphlet 
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stressed to soldiers the importance of their individual behavior to the larger war 
effort:   
You will enter Iraq both as a soldier and as an individual, because 
on our side a man can be both a soldier and an individual.  That is 
our strength – if we are smart enough to use it.  It can be our 
weakness if we aren’t.  As a soldier your duties are laid out for you.  
As an individual, it is what you do on your own that counts – and it 
may count for a lot more than you think.  American success or 
failure in Iraq may well depend on whether the Iraqis… like 
American soldiers or not… The best way you can do this is by 
getting along with the Iraqis… And the best way to get along with 
any people is to understand them.28 
 
Here, the War Department is articulating its awareness that popular opinion of 
the United States abroad would perhaps depend as much upon the individual 
behavior of American soldiers as on American policies.   
However, many of these soldiers were illiterate, and many more had so little 
experience encountering other cultures that a pamphlet would likely have had little 
impact on them.  Therefore, in addition to these pamphlets, classes were also 
available for certain troops, including for the Persian Gulf Service Command.  These 
classes and pamphlets were intended to allow soldiers to be pseudo-diplomats in 
their dealings abroad.  In a response to one of Dreyfus’ complaints about the 
inappropriate behavior of PGSC troops in Iran, Connolly wrote, “At present we are 
holding school for all troops on the subject of behavior, Iranian customs and 
traditions and proper conduct of the individual toward the Iranian people.”29  It was 
hoped that with the proper training, American troops would not damage American 
prestige abroad, and would therefore not create further challenges for American 
                                                 
28 Special Services Division, Army Service Forces, United States Army.  A Short Guide to Iraq. 
(Washington, D.C.: War and Navy Departments, 1943), 1.  
29 FRUS, 1943.  The Near East and Africa: Volume IV, 504-505. 
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diplomats.  By giving its soldiers a very basic training in diplomacy, the War 
Department was doing its part to minimize the negative effects of its military 
efforts on the United States’ long-term diplomatic objectives for the region. 
The frictions between the United States’ diplomatic and military policies 
in Iran were not limited to the halls and offices of the Pentagon or the 
Department of State Building.  They had real repercussions in Iran, and affected 
the relationships between American personnel in different departments, 
between various American offices throughout the Middle East, and between 
Americans in Iran and everyday Iranians.  A study of these relationships reveal 
greater policy conflicts on a global scale.
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Conclusion 
 
 
World War II marked a period of immense change in American-Iranian 
relations.  Just as the United States was beginning to emerge from a period of 
isolationist foreign policy, and as it was beginning to develop long-term economic 
and political policies towards Iran and the Middle East as a whole, it became 
embroiled in a global conflagration.  The military demands of the war required that 
the United States impose upon its own foreign policy goals, and use Iran as the 
staging grounds for a massive transportation campaign in order to aid the Soviet 
Union in its fight against Germany.  During the years 1941-1945, then, while both 
the State Department and the War Department each touted a policy that was in the 
interest of the United States, those two policies were often detrimental to one 
another.  By using Iran as a route to ship material to the Soviet Union, the United 
States had to take over Iranian railroads, ports, and highways, and would have to 
encroach upon Iranian sovereignty – an act that put friendly American-Iranian 
relations at risk.  On the other hand, whenever the United States gave the 
maintenance of friendly relations too much priority, and did not focus enough upon 
its military objectives in Iran, its transportation efforts would falter and the Soviet 
Union would suffer as a result.  As these military and foreign policy agendas were 
implemented, then, it became clear that it was nearly impossible for both policies to 
be pursued simultaneously and harmoniously.   
It is truly fascinating to see how the United States was only just beginning to 
develop its foreign policies towards Iran in the midst of a disastrous global conflict.  
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From the very beginning, the United States faced tremendous odds as it sought to 
foster friendly relations with Iran – odds like the military necessity of monopolizing 
Iran’s road and railroads, and the threat of competition from Communist Russia.  
While American dreams of a strong friendship with Iran were finally shattered in 
the wake of the 1953 CIA-instigated coup d'état of Mohammad Mossadeq’s 
government, during World War II, the potential outcome of American efforts were 
not so clear.   
The case of American-Iranian relations during World War II is a lesson in the 
complexities of foreign policy-making.  In any foreign policy situation, a nation’s 
policy makers are often troubled by the need to balance conflicting interests 
and considerations.  In the popular American imagination, foreign policy often 
boils down into simple, easily-digestible terms: The Monroe Doctrine, the 
Containment Policy, the Bush Doctrine.  However, the way in which nations 
interact on the global stage is never that straightforward.  Multiple thorny, 
competing issues always play into and complicate the development of  any 
foreign policy or agenda.  At the end of the day, what the American public sees 
is only the façade of what is otherwise a building of incredibly convoluted 
architecture built on the interactions among economic interests, political 
agendas, military considerations, and even diplomatic niceties.  For example, a 
study of the United States’ interactions with Iran during World War II cannot be 
complete, as we have seen, without an understanding of the Soviet Union’s 
military situation, Great Britain’s imperial interests in India, the United States’ 
isolationist history, the history of British and Russian infiltrations into Iran, the 
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personal relationships built by American minister Louis Dreyfus with key 
members of the Iranian Majlis… and the list goes on.  
Admittedly, during World War II, few in the American public cared about 
or were even aware of American efforts in Iran.  Members of the Persian Gulf 
Service Command, fully aware of their anonymity, often ruefully referred to 
themselves as the FBI – the Forgotten Bastards of Iran.1  Yet the efforts of a few 
government officials in Washington and Tehran set the course for events that 
did eventually capture the attention, fear, and ire of the American public.  
Events like the fall of Mohammad Mossadeq’s government, the 1979 Iran hostage 
crisis, and the recent disputations with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
regarding Iran’s nuclear program have all captured national media attention – and 
are all, in some form or another, the fruits of the early American diplomatic 
encounters with Iran during the 1940s.  The problems that the war posed for the 
State Department’s efforts to strengthen American-Iranian relations were not 
simply stumbling blocks – they bred resentments, hostilities, and lost opportunities.  
These problems became deeply embedded in the United States’ relationship with 
Iran, and continue to haunt American-Iranian relations to this day.   
It is difficult to exorcize the ghosts of the past – previous diplomatic 
interactions are, after all, embedded into the architecture of contemporary 
international relations.  Nations cannot ignore their past policies and actions.  The 
trick is how to overcome the past, and how to rise above it.  The tenth-century poet 
Abul Ala al Ma'arri once wrote that “history is a poem in which the words change, 
                                                 
1 Bernard Herbert Ragsdale.  1942-1945. A Railroader Goes to War:  The Personal WWII Diary of PFC 
Herbert Bernard Ragsdale.  http://www.ww2diary.com/1942.html.  (accessed 7 April 2009). 
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but the rhythm recurs.”  History has shown, however, that relationships between 
nations can change – that rifts can grow between fast friends, and that friends can 
be made of mortal enemies.  The question is whether the United States and Iran will 
overcome their past, and can change the rhythm of their relationship.  We can 
certainly hope that with good intentions and prudent diplomatic decision-making, 
the United States and Iran will eventually come to terms with their shared past. 
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